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INTRODUCTION
There is enormous risk inherent in the process of negotiating an
agreement, as those involved must rely on the belief that they have all the relevant
information that they need in order to make a wise deal. Historically, parties to a
transaction were expected to fend for themselves in the information gathering
process, as was inherent in the old Latin maxim caveat emptor, or "let the buyer
beware."' Nondisclosure in the formation of agreements leads to negative
repercussions throughout the law, triggering issues ranging from mistake in
contract law, to misrepresentation and fraud in tort law, to unfair dealing in the law
of agency, and even to the breach of fiduciary duty.2 In recent decades, the law has
recognized the injustice and inefficiency perpetrated as a result of this approach
and has largely abandoned caveat emptor and its permissive policies regarding
nondisclosure in favor of limited duties to disclose material information. 3 This is
true except in the context of agreements made between those involved in romantic
or intimate relationships.4
1. Caveat emptor is defined as "a doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their
own risk." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (8th ed. 2004).
2. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 329, 330 nn.2-6 (1991) (providing illustrations of
applicable Restatement provisions).
3. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9.20, at
338 (4th ed. 1998).
4. For the purposes of this Article, "intimates" means two people engaged in an
emotionally and physically intimate relationship. Although emotional intimacy can exist
between two people without physical intimacy and can lead to trust and vulnerability (and
physical intimacy can exist without emotional intimacy), the focus of this Article is the
unique closeness and vulnerability typically created by sexual intimacy.
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In spite of compelling evidence of vulnerability in the context of
negotiations and contract formation between intimates, the law has clung to the
anachronistic principles permitting nondisclosure.5 The reasons for tolerating
nondisclosure, or even affirmative misrepresentation, of material information in
the context of contract formation between intimates are obscure. To be sure, some
agreements made between intimates do not resemble legally enforceable contracts,
in that the parties do not intend their promises to be legally binding.6 Thus, one
might envision a different set of norms that would govern those promises.
Yet, courts now hear a growing number of cases involving issues ranging
from property allocation in separations of unmarried cohabitants to paternity and
child support disputes. 7 These cases demonstrate that, in many instances, at least
one party to an agreement with an intimate mistakenly presumes not only that the
other person is being truthful, but also that promises between them are binding.
Why should the law tolerate nondisclosure in this setting, when the same behavior
would be viewed as impermissible between those who bargain at arm's-length?
This inconsistency in the law is increasingly problematic and
unjustifiable. This Article aims to resolve the inconsistency in the law's treatment
of agreements between intimates, in particular the law's response to evidence of
nondisclosure, by subjecting these bargains to the same rules used in evaluating
virtually all other agreements. I begin by setting out a brief history of the common
law governing disclosure duties between partners to other basic types of
agreements, illustrating the expansion of these duties over the past century and
explaining their justifications.
The Article then turns to a detailed examination of the types of
agreements made between intimates. Part II explores agreements made at the start
of an intimate relationship-in particular, examining the legal response to
problems of nondisclosure that surface when parties negotiate access to sexual
intimacy. Part III discusses agreements made in the context of committed
relationships, reviewing contemporary law governing unmarried cohabitants and
the tolerance of nondisclosure that results from the law's discomfort with
enforcing agreements made between these parties. Part IV discusses agreements
made at the end of an intimate relationship, which typically reflect parties' efforts
to "settle" any claims they might have. That Part exposes how the law tolerates,
and even embraces, a norm of nondisclosure when evaluating these cases.
Having demonstrated that the law continues to permit nondisclosure in
agreements between intimates, the subsequent Parts analyze the justifications
underlying this policy. Part V applies the two common justifications for expanding
the duty to disclose in arm's-length transactions (efficiency and fairness) to
agreements made between intimates. In that Part, I conclude that these same
justifications of efficiency and fairness argue as forcefully in favor of requiring
5. For examples of vulnerability in bargaining between intimates, see infra
notes 241-42, 247-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of some of the
psychological barriers to bargaining between intimates, see infra Part V.A.2.
6. See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text (discussing bargains that fail
for want of mutual assent).
7. See infra notes 121, 175 and accompanying text.
873
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disclosure when the parties are intimates. Part VI considers, and ultimately rejects,
alternate justifications for tolerating greater nondisclosure in agreements between
intimates than would be permitted in other settings.
This Article concludes that the effect of permitting nondisclosure in
agreements between intimates is unjust and harmful, both at the individual and
societal level. The law's resistance to imposing consistent rules regarding
disclosure in this context seems to be predicated largely upon the fear that lies and
nondisclosure are commonplace between intimates and that legal intervention
would harm human relationships.8 Ironically, as I will demonstrate, it is the failure
to protect the vulnerable in this setting that serves to harm human relationships.
I. THE NARROWEST FRAMING OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE: THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY REIGN OF CA VEATEMPTOR
Commentators reflecting on nineteenth-century U.S. legal history note
that the courts of that era were unsympathetic to the claims of vulnerable parties.
In his famous text, The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore concluded: "As we look
back on the nineteenth century theories, we are struck most of all, I think, by the
narrow scope of social duty which they implicitly assumed. No man is his
brother's keeper; the race is to the swift; let the devil take the hindmost." 9 One of
the best examples of this attitude lies in the relatively narrow scope of disclosure
duties between partners to an agreement, specifically in the then-popular doctrine
of caveat emptor, with its brash every man for himself attitude.' This Part explores
how nineteenth-century courts moved from a firm embrace of the doctrine of
caveat emptor to a more nuanced rule on disclosure that takes into account the
competing doctrines of good faith and efficiency.
A. The Common Law Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
The doctrine of caveat emptor dominated much of nineteenth-century
U.S. commercial law and dictated that parties dealing in arm's-length transactions
had no duty to disclose information that could otherwise be discovered. The classic
illustration of this principle is found in the case of Laidlaw v. Organ.I
This case arose out of a deal struck in the shadow of the end of the War of
1812. News of signing the Treaty of Ghent, and of the war's end, was slow to
arrive in New Orleans, where the British fleet blockaded the harbor. The blockade
had depressed the prices for tobacco crops. Organ, the plaintiff, learned of the
treaty ending the war the night before the news was disclosed to the public. Acting
quickly, he purchased a large quantity of tobacco at the depressed price from
Laidlaw, who at the time of sale inquired whether there was any news that would
affect tobacco prices. Organ remained silent, failing to disclose his knowledge of
8. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-heart
balm movement); infra notes 286, 301 and accompanying text (discussing the work of
Professor Katharine K. Baker).
9. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (1974).
10. Wonnell, supra note 2, at 338.
11. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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the treaty. As soon as the news of the treaty spread, tobacco prices rose by 30-
50%. Laidlaw refused to tender the tobacco to Organ, who then sued.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-buyer,
rejecting the seller's claim that the buyer's nondisclosure amounted to fraud.
12
Instead, the Court embraced the principle of caveat emptor, reasoning that the
seller had equal opportunity to discover the treaty on his own or, at the very least,
press the buyer harder on whether there was reason to believe the price might
rise.
13
Even at the peak of caveat emptor, however, the law limited its scope
with numerous exceptions. First, the law of misrepresentation or concealment
served to narrow the breadth of caveat emptor by forbidding a party from lying or
misstating the facts to induce the other party's consent to a bargain, drawing a
bright line between misstatement and mere omission. 14 Had Organ replied that
there was no reason to believe prices were about to rise instead of simply
remaining silent, the deal would have been voidable due to his affirmative
misrepresentation of the facts.
15
Second, even in the context of nondisclosure, the common law rule
permitting nondisclosure always made exceptions for situations in which,
following the formation of an agreement, supervening law required disclosure, and
likewise in which a party's original statement was true and made in good faith, but
supervening events rendered it no longer true.16 For example, if someone makes an
accurate report of her sound financial status to a potential business partner but does
not report a subsequent financial catastrophe, she is guilty of a misrepresentation,
even though the original assertion was true when it was made.'
7
Finally, the common law made an exception for cases in which one party
was aware that the other was "operating under a mistake as to a basic assumption
on which the negotiations are based... ."" A long line of cases held that, in such
circumstances, the "aware" party had a duty to correct the other's mistaken
12. Many commentators have noted that, if the record is accurate, the buyer's
silence is more than mere nondisclosure; it is intentionally misleading, and therefore a
misrepresentation. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 n.27 (1978). Randy Barnett offers perhaps the
most widely accepted contemporary justification of the holding in favor of the defendant's
right of nondisclosure. See Randy Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract:
Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 783 (1992). Barnett argues that there was no duty to disclose because the price
information was extrinsic and ultimately would have reached the market. Id. at 798. Thus,
the seller was not entitled to a truthful answer; it was his duty to uncover the value of his
own goods. Id. at 799.
13. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 193-94.
14. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 337 (citing W. Page Keeton, Fraud-
Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1936)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. c, illus. I (1981).
18. CALAMARi & PER.Lo, supra note 3, at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 161 (b)).
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assumption, even if the "aware" party did not cause it. 19 Initially, the mistaken
assumption doctrine, which dates back to the early nineteenth century, 20 was
applied to the problem of latent defects, particularly in the sale of property.
2
'
Taken more broadly, however, this exception could swallow caveat emptor
altogether. Ultimately, the spirit behind the mistaken assumption exception has
driven the broad-scaled reform of caveat emptor doctrine.
B. The Expansion of the Affirmative Duty to Disclose
Over the course of the twentieth century, in a variety of contexts, courts
and legislatures modified the doctrine of caveat emptor, recognizing increasingly
broad disclosure duties to limit the harsh consequences of contracts formed on the
basis of one party's inaccurate information.22 This reform occurred in a host of
contexts, ranging from the sale of land to commercial transactions. 23 Reform of
nineteenth-century contracting mores began when courts embraced a duty of
cooperation for parties performing contractual obligations.24 In the marketplace, a
fairly stringent standard of fair dealing replaced the nineteenth-century laissez-
faire bargaining norm.2 5 As commercial actors discovered that honesty stabilized
the marketplace and encouraged transactions, strict adherence to caveat emptor fell
19. Id. at 337-38.
20. See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 112-13 (1993).
21. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 338 (citing Morton J. Horwitz, The
Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 917, 926 (1974)).
22. For a comprehensive overview of this reform, see Palmieri, supra note 20, at
200. See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247-48 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Even at common law. .. there has been a trend away from strict adherence to
the harsh maxim caveat emptor and toward a more flexible, less formalistic understanding
of the duty to disclose. Steps have been taken toward application of the 'special facts'
doctrine in a broader array of contexts where one party's superior knowledge of essential
facts renders a transaction without disclosure inherently unfair." (citation omitted)).
23. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 307, 311-12 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970)
("[C]aveat emptor... was premised upon the principle that all traders came to the market
place on an equal footing. ... The premise that commercial transactions are between parties
with equal bargaining power and resources has long ago fallen by the wayside. The law has
responded to the demands for greater protection of the consumer or purchaser, and the
placing of greater responsibility upon the manufacturer and seller of personal property, by
adoption of manufacturers' strict liability on creation of dangerous instrumentalities and
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness of purpose." (citation omitted)); Lingsch
v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1963) ("It is now settled in California that
where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property
which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to,
or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under
a duty to disclose them to the buyer."); Jenkins v. McCormick, 339 P.2d 8, 11 (Kan. 1959)
(caveat emptor does not apply to shield builder from liability where builder concealed and
did not disclose defect).
24. See Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature 'Deceit "': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 413 (1993);
see also Palmieri, supra note 20, at 112-13.
25. See generally Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law
Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 393 (1980).
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into disfavor.26 In his groundbreaking work, Professor Ian MacNeil documents the
growth of new business contracting practices that feature a relational norm and
reject harshly adversarial arm's-length dealing.27 Rather than viewing contracts as
discrete agreements, in which both parties attempt to optimize their individual
well-being, the relational contract theory notices that many parties doing business
have long-term relationships with one another. As such, their contracts might be
viewed as part of a series of dealings between partners with an interest in one
another's well-being and therefore will aim to protect reliance and expectation
interests by honoring goals such as mutuality and reciprocity.
2
This expansion of the law governing the duty to disclose is reflected in
the Uniform Commercial Code and also in the Restatement of Torts.29 In contract
law, courts articulated broader duties of disclosure in both contract formation and
performance. For example, Judge Posner discussed the distinction between proper
and improper conduct in Market Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, which
involved allegations of bad faith in contract performance:
[I]t is one thing to say that you can exploit your superior knowledge
of the market-for if you cannot, you will not be able to recoup the
investment you made in obtaining that knowledge-or that you are
not required to spend money bailing out a contract partner who has
gotten into trouble. It is another thing to say that you can take
deliberate advantage of an oversight by your contract partner
concerning his rights under the contract. Such taking advantage is
not the exploitation of superior knowledge or the avoidance of
unbargained-for expense; it is sharp dealing. Like theft, it has no
social product, and also like theft it induces costly defensive
expenditures ... 3
Although it is clear that the duty of good faith grows progressively
stronger as the parties move from the negotiation of their agreement to the
performance of it,31 it is equally clear that the failure to disclose material
information in the process of contract formation may render the contract
26. See Palmieri, supra note 20, at 113-14.
27. Larson, supra note 24, at 413.
28. For a concise summary of this paradigm shift, see id. at 413 (citing MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 48-49 (1992); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY
INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 71-119 (1980); Ian R. MacNeil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 483, 523-24 & n. 186 (1985)).
29. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 1-304 (2005). Section 1-201 defines good faith as
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade. Section 1-304 imposes this duty on all contracts under the U.C.C. in their
performance or enforcement. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 205 (1977)
(imposing a similar duty).
30. 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
31. Id. at 595 ("The formation or negotiation stage is precontractual, and here the
duty [of good faith] is minimized. It is greater not only at the performance but also at the
enforcement stage, which is also postcontractual.").
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voidable.32 For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that one
makes a misrepresentation through nondisclosure:
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that
party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing.
(c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to the contents or effect of a writing,
evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole or in part. [or]
(d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a
relation of trust and confidence between them.33
According to this provision, if the undisclosed information is "material," the
ignorant party may later void the contract. Information is material if it reasonably
would have affected the party's willingness to enter into the negotiated deal.34
Caselaw provides ample evidence of the full reach of the duty to disclose.
Indeed, even in what some perceive to be the last stronghold of caveat emptor,
negotiations of commercial transactions between experienced merchants, 35 courts
have all but eviscerated the right to remain silent.36 Contemporary law governing
the sale of goods supplies numerous warranties designed to guard against unfair
bargaining and surprise.37 A prime example of this change is the death of the
"battle of the forms" rule. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the common law required that written forms setting out the terms of an agreement
be identical.3' As a result, in situations where the written terms of the purchase
order and the acknowledgement of sale varied, there was no contract formed by the
writings. Instead, the law found a unilateral contract, to be governed by the terms
of the last document sent prior to the first act of performance on the contract
(typically, the shipment of goods).
The "battle of the forms" rule proved to be unfair in practice because
merchants seldom paid attention to the fine print in the many forms governing
transactions.39 In these situations, parties quite naturally could be surprised by the
32. See Palmieri, supra note 20, at 139, 160.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
34. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 327.
35. Palmieri, supra note 20, at 113 ("Caveat emptor's only legal stronghold
remains those areas in which professionals are involved in reaching commercial
agreements.").
36. See id. at 113-18.
37. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-207, 2-312 to 2-318 (2005).
38. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U.S.
149 (1886).
39. Many scholars have discussed this seemingly puzzling lack of attention by
businesspeople to the legal implications of their actions. See Stewart Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts
and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966); Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer
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actual terms of the contract when a dispute arose.4 ° Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-207 corrects this problem by requiring contracting parties to make each
other expressly aware of any "material change" in contract terms before those
terms take effect. 41 This affords even the sophisticated merchant a reprieve,
insuring that a contracting partner must affirmatively disclose any truly unusual
42
change to the contract.
The law of torts complements, but does not wholly duplicate, contract law
disclosure provisions. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of
misrepresentation as follows:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the
other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation.43
The primary distinction between the tort and contract standards is that, to
recover in tort, one must show that the misrepresentation was intentional, whereas
in contract law, it is sufficient that the misrepresentation was material." Thus,
"conduct that might not rise to the level of fraud may nonetheless violate the duty
and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966); Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer
Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 237
(1952); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. REv.
1, 36, 41 (1992); James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, An
Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WAsHIuRN L.J. 1 (1982). Relational
contract theorists point to a gap between the law of contracts on the books, and the law in
action. This gap is caused, at least in part, by "the fact that businesspeople frequently-even
generally-ignore the law of contract, or even do not realize how it might regulate various
aspects of their agreements." Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of
Risk Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 71, 109 (1998).
40. For insight into the policies driving the promulgation of section 2-207, see
Bruce A. Americus, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code-New Rules for the
"Battle of the Forms," 32 U. Prr. L. REv. 209, 212 (1971).
41. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2005) ("[A]dditional terms are to be construed as
proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the
contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they
materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received."). "Whether or not additional or
different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of
subsection (2). If they are such as materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be
included unless expressly agreed to by the other party." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (2005).
42. But see Katie Hafner, It May Be Boilerplate, but Read Before You Click,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1998, at G3; see also Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey,
Jr., Adapting Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and
Suggestions, 26 RuTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 215 (2000).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a), (d) (1981).
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of good faith in dealing with one's contractual partners and thereby give rise to a
remedy under contract law. 45
In addition, Restatement (Second) of Torts section 551 echoes the
obligation to bargain in good faith by prescribing a duty to disclose the following:
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them; and (b) matters known to him that he knows to be
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts
from being misleading; and (c) subsequently acquired information
that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous
representation that when made was true or believed to be so; and (d)
the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it
would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is
about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and (e)
facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because
of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts.46
Over the course of the twentieth century, the failure to disclose material
facts during contract formation increasingly placed parties at risk of violating the
growing duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts.47 Of course, the definition
of good faith is somewhat vague and malleable, and it has evolved according to
community standards.4 8 Moreover, considerable controversy exists as to whether
contract remedies, as opposed to tort remedies, should apply to a breach of the
duty of good faith.49 It is clear, however, that the evolution of this duty has eroded
the doctrine of caveat emptor, replacing it with legal duties that "discourage
dishonesty, and encourage loyalty, fairness and openness, thus fostering trade and
commerce, rewarding honesty and candor and condemning deceit of whatever
kind. 5°
This is not to say that the movement away from caveat emptor has been
universal. One notable exception is the duty of a buyer, as opposed to a seller, to
disclose information relevant to the object of a particular transaction. For instance,
must a buyer disclose that the piece of property he wishes to buy is more valuable
than the seller believes it to be? In these cases, courts almost always hold that the
buyer need not disclose even material facts relevant to the sale at hand. 51 This is
true whether the transaction involves real property or goods.52
45. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1991)
(citing Burton, supra note 25, at 372 n.17).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551.
47. See Palmieri, supra note 20, at 76.
48. See id. at 79.
49. Id. at 100-07.
50. Id. at 106.
51. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 339 n.26.
52. See id. at 339.
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The absence of a buyer's duty to disclose shows that caveat emptor has
become the exception rather than the rule. Unlike nineteenth-century cases that
embraced caveat emptor because courts felt that both parties had equal opportunity
to discover all relevant information prior to making a bargain, more recent cases
predicate their outcomes on notions of efficiency. 53 Rather than using the doctrine
of caveat emptor to justify the buyer's right to refrain from disclosure, courts
invoke notions of efficiency and the importance of rewarding the buyer's
industriousness.54
The fact that courts are reluctant to impose a duty to disclose in cases
involving buyers with knowledge of material information does not mean that
courts are wholly comfortable with the resulting contracts. Indeed, the law of
equity typically will not order specific performance of a contract formed in the
wake of a buyer's nondisclosure of material information." In the event that the
seller refuses to perform once the undisclosed fact emerges, the buyer may seek
monetary damages, but specific performance is limited to contracts that are "fair
and open, and in regard to which all material matters known to each have been
communicated to the other., 5 6 Thus, one might observe that even the cases that
follow caveat emptor do so in a defensive manner, revealing that the traditional
rule no longer is sufficiently strong to dictate an outcome in a given case. Instead,
in assessing enforceability, courts look to external considerations relating to the
nature of the undisclosed information and the parties' relationship.57
53. See infra notes 54, 59.
54. For an example of an efficiency-based support of a nondisclosure rule, see
Nussbaum v. Weeks, 263 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367 (Ct. App. 1989). Weeks, a district water
manager, purchased a number of tracts of land knowing the water district would soon allow
them to be irrigated, thus increasing the value of the land. Id. at 362. He did not disclose this
information to Mr. Nussbaum, the seller. See id. The court found that while Weeks might be
removed from office for abusing his position, there was no duty to disclose to the individual
seller. Id. at 365. The court stated:
"If the buyer's duty were extended as broadly as the seller's duty, the
rule would result in the ridiculous conclusion that a buyer must disclose
to the seller factors that have or will indicate that the seller is selling the
property below its true value. Absent affirmative representation, such a
rule would eliminate the freedom to negotiate in the marketplace."
Id. at 367 (quoting 1 HARRY D. MILLER & MARvIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 2D:
REAL PROPERTY DIGEST § 1.121, at 414 (2d ed. 1991)).
55. See, e.g., Rothmiller v. Stein, 38 N.E. 718, 721 (N.Y. 1894) (refusing to
enforce specific performance because the contract was not fair and open, with all material
matters known by each party having been communicated to the other).
56. CALAMARI & PERaLo, supra note 3, at 340 (quoting Rothmiller, 38 N.E. at
721).
57. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure
Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the .Meta-Theories, Georgetown Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 614501; UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-4
(Nov. 1, 2004) (isolating and evaluating categories of cases in which disclosure has been
mandated), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=614501.
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C. Policy Justifications for an Expansive Duty to Disclose
Over the course of the twentieth century, courts came to intone two
broad-based policy justifications for rejecting caveat emptor and promoting
disclosure in contract formation. The first of these is efficiency, and the second is a
more abstract notion of fairness. The nondisclosure of information, particularly
information that is readily known to one party but harder for the other to discover,
heightens the risk that the resulting bargain will be based upon faulty information.
The resulting bargain not only offends our sense of fair play, but also may lead to
market inefficiencies, such as litigation, a more cumbersome negotiation process in
the future, or a reluctance to enter into bargains.58 These costs are most readily
avoided by imposing a general duty to disclose material information during the
contract-formation process.59
1. Arm 's-Length Transactions
The embrace of efficiency as an overarching goal of the legal system can
be seen in cases applying both statutory and common law, particularly in cases
involving the proverbial arm's-length transaction between relative strangers. The
law of warranties is a fine example of the promotion of efficiency. The law of
implied warranties allocates responsibility for the merchantability of a good to the
manufacturer rather than requiring the buyer to negotiate the issue of whether a
given product actually will do what it is designed to do.60 By penalizing
nondisclosure, warranty law alters the common law's neutrality regarding the
seller's prerogative, inherent in caveat emptor, to remain silent.
At common law, most courts today relieve buyers from the duty to
investigate where they find that a reasonable investigation would not have yielded
useful information. In the sale of new homes, for instance, twentieth-century
common law largely abandoned caveat emptor, owing to the fact tiat "[t]here are
myriad possibilities of hidden and latent defects in the construction of a home, and
most purchasers are not capable by training or experience to detect or recognize
them.,"
61
58. See Palmieri, supra note 20, at 104; see also Larson, supra note 24, at 413.
59. Indeed, efficiency is the moving force behind the landmark article on the
topic of disclosure, Anthony Kronman, Mistake Disclosure, Information and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1978). In this piece, Kronman questions the result in
Laidlaw v. Organ and argues that because "information is the antidote to mistake," the law
should provide incentives favoring the rapid disclosure of changed market circumstances.
Id. at4, 9-18.
60. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-318 (2005).
61. Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 307, 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970) ("Our
research indicates the present weight of authority in this country and England is either to
evade or restrict the application of caveat emptor to the sale of a new house, either during
construction or after completion, by a builder-vendor. The method most prevalent appears
to be that of an implied warranty of habitability or fitness for the use for which
purchased."); see also Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (1991) ("Where a
condition which has been created by the seller materially impairs the value of the contract
and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller or unlikely to be discovered by a
prudent purchaser exercising due care with respect to the subject transaction, nondisclosure
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In addition to efficiency-based justifications, the law of caveat emptor has
given way to fairness considerations. Parties with unequal access to information
risk negotiating substantively unfair deals. Parties that lack information lack an
equal footing as they enter into the contracting process. Fairness-based reforms of
caveat emptor can be seen in a wide range of cases. For instance, consider the line
of cases redressing harms incurred by buyers of real property due to the failure to
disclose material information. 2 Surely some of the undisclosed information, such
as the fact that a house is uninhabitable, might be discovered by an industrious
buyer.6 In spite of the fact that the buyers could have discovered the true value of
their deal with a bit more effort, considerations of fairness have led courts to
permit buyers to avoid these contracts.
A more familiar example arises out of the caselaw governing the doctrine
of unconscionability. Consider the well-known case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co.,64 in which the defendant furniture company sold the plaintiff a
number of household furnishings on credit. The contract contained a grossly unfair
cross-collateralization clause, rendering all of the plaintiff's purchases vulnerable
to repossession in the event of a default on any single item.65 The court found that,
although ordinarily buyers assume the risk of being surprised by an unfair term by
signing a document they did not read, the poor economic status and education level
of the purchaser combined with the deceptive practices of the seller made it unfair
to hold the purchaser to the usual standard.66
constitutes a basis for rescission as a matter of equity. Any other outcome places upon the
buyer not merely the obligation to exercise care in his purchase but rather to be omniscient
with respect to any fact which may affect the bargain. No practical purpose is served by
imposing such a burden upon a purchaser. To the contrary, it encourages predatory business
practice and offends the principle that equity will suffer no wrong to be without a
remedy.").
62. Stambovsky, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (citing Rothmiller v. Stein, 143 N.Y. 581,
591-92 (1894)).
63. At common law, no implied warranties of habitability or fitness were
recognized for the sale of real property, or for the leasing of new or old housing. The
modem trend, however, implies such warranties in both instances. See CALAMAIu &
PERILLO, supra note 3, at 339.
64. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In addition to deals that are undermined by
economic impediments to value, there are cases involving the failure to disclose
psychological impediments. Id.; see also, e.g., Cochran, 252 So. 2d at 311-12; Stambovsky,
572 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
65. The contract stated that "all payments now and hereafter made by
(purchaser) shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the
Company by (purchaser) at the time each payment is made." Id. at 447. The effect of this
term was that no individual item was paid off until all the items were paid off together. This
meant that if the purchaser defaulted on one item, all the items purchased, even if they were
purchased years before and the customer had since paid a sum that would otherwise have
paid off all the items but the most recent purchase, Walker-Thomas could repossess them
all.
66. Id. at 449.
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2. Disclosure Duties in Transactions Between Fiduciaries or Confidants
The displacement of caveat emptor by fairness-based justifications for a
duty to disclose is perhaps most readily observed in the law governing confidential
relationships-relationships in which the parties, by definition, operate closer than
at arm's-length. The law envisions the classic contract relationship as one in which
both parties are presumed to be motivated by self-interest and aware of the need to
67protect themselves from each other's self-interested behavior. Hence, they
bargain at arm's-length, ideally striking a bargain that maximizes their personal
welfare.68
The law also recognizes that some relationships do not lend themselves to
arm's-length dealings. Often there is an imbalance of power between the parties,
creating the risk of exploitation for the more vulnerable party. The parties
understand that the relationship triggers responsibilities on the part of the more
powerful party to act in the best interests of the more vulnerable party. These
relationships are termed "fiduciary," and although the term originated in the realm
of trusts and agency, over the course of the past one hundred years it has come to
apply to a broad range of individuals who hold positions of trust.6 9 These include
"agents, partners, directors and officers, trustees, executors and administrators,
receivers, bailees, . . . guardians, and doctors.
70
In addition, courts long have adhered to the notion that certain
relationships, termed "confidential" relationships, are marked by a higher duty of
loyalty between parties because of the closeness of their relationship rather than
because one party necessarily is more powerful than the other.71 In different
jurisdictions, "confidential relationships" may include married couples, married
and engaged couples, or only those a court finds to have a confidential relationship
on a case-by-case basis.72 Nonetheless, once a court finds that parties to an
agreement were fiduciaries or "confidentials," the law governing their relationship
shifts dramatically.73
The primary consequence of classifying a relationship as "fiduciary" or
"confidential" is the limitation of a fiduciary's ability to maximize self-interest
when bargaining with one who holds that fiduciary in a position of trust.74 The law
67. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 799 (1983) ("Instead of
asserting personal dominance over the other party, each party must persuade the other to
exchange. Nevertheless, the parties are in conflict, as each party must protect himself from
the other's self-interested behavior.").
68. Id. at 800.
69. Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 451, 455 n. 17 (2000).
70. Id. (quoting Frankel, supra note 67, at 795).
71. See 41 Am. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 1 (2004) ("The relationship between
a husband and wife is the most confidential of all relationships and has been described as a
fiduciary relationship."); see also Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 57, at 16-19.
72. See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 57, at 18-19.
73. See generally Frankel, supra note 67, at 809-11.
74. Id. at 799 ("In sum, in status relations the Power Bearer dominates the
Dependent and the Dependent's freedom is limited in order to ensure the means for his
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governing fiduciaries recognizes that the trust inherent in these relationships raises
the potential for an abuse of power. 75 As such, fiduciary law limits the capacity for
abuse by reducing the fiduciary's discretion, prohibiting suspect transactions, and
penalizing fiduciaries who violate the trust of those who rely upon them.
7 6
Likewise, the law governing confidential relationships works to prevent parties
from taking advantage of confidants by exploiting their trust.77 Summarizing the
common law governing confidential relationships, Professor Mark Gergen notes:
A person doing business with a confidant must disclose material
information. More generally, a person who does business with a
confidant has the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction.
A person may not invoke the statute of frauds or insist upon other
legal formalities as a defense when sued by a confidant. An informal
understanding between confidants on the sharing of wealth may lay
the basis for a restitution claim. Restitution may be required within a
confidential relationship for wealth acquired through the
relationship even in the absence of an understanding on sharing. In
addition, a person may not disclose secrets learned from a
confidant. 8
Read together, the duty to bargain in good faith and the concept of
fiduciary duty show that context matters in determining whether a given bargain is
fair. In light of this observation, one might expect that the law governing
agreements between individuals involved in intimate relationships would be
mediated, to a great extent, by the duties to disclose material information. After all,
an intimate relationship is by definition much closer than an arm's-length
transaction, and as a result, those who bargain within the context of intimate
relationships are more susceptible to overreaching and abuse.79 Therefore, it is
survival, but the Power Bearer must also limit abuse in the exercise of his power in order to
meet his own needs.").
75. See id at 804.
76. See, e.g., id. at 807-08; Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor:
Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 241, 247 (1995).
77. See Larson, supra note 24, at 409.
78. Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the
American Common Law, 68 FoRD)HAM L. REv. 407, 476-78 (1999) (citations omitted).
79. Indeed, this observation constitutes another justification for increasing the
legal duty between intimates. See, e.g., Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the
Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599 (1991). Balos and Fellows
predicate their argument regarding the barriers to prosecuting nonstranger rape upon their
observation that there is a confidential, or fiduciary, relationship between sexual intimates:
[Tihe doctrine of confidential relationship, whether reflecting inequality
of power or a relationship of trust, represents the law's unwillingness to
allow the classical liberal tradition of individuality to be the instrument
of unjust treatment of one person by another. Moreover, it goes further
and imposes an affirmative duty on one person to act in the interest of
another. The law imposes only limited duties between strangers, but
requires persons who are connected with each other to act in each other's
interest.
Id. at 601-02.
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quite surprising to find that the law governing bargains between sexually intimate
individuals is ambivalent, at best, in terms of the extent to which it protects parties
against nondisclosure or requires that bargains be made in good faith.
II. DECEPTION AND DISCLOSURE IN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
INTIMATES
Individuals who are sexually or romantically intimate negotiate and form
agreements in myriad ways.80 After describing the range of "contracting" behavior
between intimates, this Part will review the disclosure problems arising out of
these agreements and demonstrate the remarkable persistence of a norm tolerating
nondisclosure in resolving disputes between intimates.
Agreements between intimates can be divided into three broad categories.
First, there are agreements arising out of the process of negotiating sexual
intimacy. Second, there are agreements made within the context of a committed
relationship, typically regarding future intentions and the allocation of resources.
Finally, there are agreements made upon the dissolution of a relationship that are
intended to settle some legal and financial matters between individuals who have
decided to separate.
If a couple is legally married, courts tend to look to family law, rather
than contract law, to determine the enforceability of these types of promises."
Therefore, issues of contract and tort law primarily arise in cases involving the
enforceability of promises made between unmarried couples, both heterosexual
and homosexual.
In this Article, I focus exclusively on agreements made between
unmarried sexually intimate partners. There are two main reasons for this focus.
First, these bargains are governed by contract and tort law, which, at least in
theory, are the same laws that apply to all other agreements (for example,
commercial transactions). Problems pertaining to nondisclosure frequently arise in
contracts between unmarried intimates. This is not surprising considering the
potential for overreaching and manipulation in the context of an intimate
relationship.8 2 It is this potential vulnerability that leads to my second reason for
electing to focus only on agreements made between unmarried sexually intimate
partners. The very absence of the family law system means that these couples
bargain without a safety net. Nonetheless, these unmarried couples are often just as
80. For the working definition of intimacy used in this Article, see supra note 4.
81. This is especially true in agreements that do not involve the distribution of
property in the event of a divorce. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the
Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 65 (1998). Silbaugh argues that courts will usually
enforce contracts determining the distribution of property and, less frequently, contracts
restricting rights to alimony, but they will not enforce contracts concerning other topics at
all. Even when a court will enforce a contract between married parties, it will be subject to a
much higher standard than commercial contracts, providing an additional layer of protection
denied to intimates who are not married. Id. at 74.
82. See Larson, supra note 24, at 422.
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vulnerable as married couples to exploitation, manipulation, and other
overreaching in making deals with their partners.8 3
To illustrate the application of principles governing disclosure in this
setting, in this Part, I will consider the norms underlying the formation of
agreements pertaining to access to sexual intimacy. In Part III, I turn to the topic of
agreements made in the context of an ongoing, committed relationship. Finally, in
Part IV, I consider the more expressly contractual nature of agreements made upon
the dissolution of a relationship, addressing in detail the example of paternity-
related settlements. In all three contexts, courts reveal a far greater embrace of the
norm of nondisclosure than they do in other contemporary cases, commercial and
otherwise.
A. Negotiating Access to Sexual Intimacy: Deception, Disclosure, and the
Problem of Sexual Fraud
On occasion, agreements made at the inception of a sexual relationship
are explicitly contractual in nature. It is relatively easy to compare the norms
pertaining to disclosure and misrepresentation in this context with the norms
governing arm's-length transactions. For example, some relationships commence
with an explicit bargain of some sort. Such bargains typically are at issue in cases
of seduction, in which a suitor's promises are offered in exchange for the
"victim's" consent to sexual relations.8 4 More commonly, parties enter into sexual
relationships while relying upon express or implied promises regarding health
status, capacity to conceive, or marital status. 5 Although much has been written
about promises made in exchange for or in relation to sexual intimacy, the law
governing the duty to disclose material facts in this context is neither well settled
nor consistent with principles of contract or tort law in other contexts.86
In many ways, sexual bargaining remains subject to a norm of
nondisclosure. The controversial case of seduction is an example of this, as it not
only tolerates nondisclosure, but also permits express misrepresentations. 87 In the
traditional common law case of seduction, the victim's family was permitted to sue
for damages against a suitor who made false promises of love and marriage in
83. Id.
84. Id. at 379-80. For a rich historical review of the tort of seduction, see
generally id.
85. Another example of the problem of nondisclosure in couples negotiating
intimacy may be seen in a recent Italian case, in which a woman successfully sued her new
husband for his failure to tell her that he was impotent before they married. Sex a
Constitutional Right in Italy, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 12, 2005.
86. For a discussion of sex's unique place in contract bargaining, see LINDA R.
HiRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 286-94 (1998).
87. Larson, supra note 24, at 417-18 ("Today, . . . courts rarely consider it
unlawful to deceive someone into agreeing to sex. Although force and fraud are equated
when it comes to money, the same analysis is not usually extended to sex. It is both a tort
and a crime to take money by false pretenses, but in most jurisdictions it is lawful to obtain
consent to sex by intentionally deceiving one's partner.").
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order to procure her consent to sexual relations. 8 The common law tort of
seduction evolved in the late eighteenth century in order to remedy the assorted
harms occasioned when a woman relied, to her detriment, upon a promise of
marriage offered by her suitor.89 More precisely, this tort was designed to permit
the father of the woman "scorned" by her lover to recover for the harm he had
inflicted upon him by damaging his daughter's reputation, and thus, her prospects
for marriage. 90
The tort of seduction sought to provide for a wide range of damages. The
losses of virginity and a reputation for chastity often were devastating for a young
woman, severely limiting her chances of marrying, or at least making a "good"
marriage.91 Even though, until the early twentieth century, the woman herself
could not sue for damages, the tort of seduction allowed her father to procure the
resources that she might otherwise have secured only through marriage. 92 This
route to compensation was especially important when the woman found herself
single and pregnant.93 Unwed motherhood not only stigmatized the woman and her
"bastard" child, but in a time when the law made no provision for child support, it
also typically led to a life of impoverishment.94
The tort of seduction also remedied the broken heart. This harm was the
most intangible, and therefore, the most controversial.95 The emotional damage
suffered by the betrayal of a loved one can be very real and very powerful.96
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the "anti-heart balm" movement
successfully campaigned for the eradication of the tort of seduction.97 Arguing that
the suffering sought to be remedied by this tort was too open to fraud and too
difficult to quantify monetarily, a coalition of legislators, supported by feminists
and advocates of sexual equality and liberation, brought about the broad-scaled
repeal of the tort of seduction.98
As a result, an era of caveat emptor in intimate relationships began.
Suddenly, one who had no intention of marrying could promise marriage in
88. Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REv. 817, 821
(1996).
89. Id. at 818-19.
90. Id. at 821.
91. Larson, supra note 24, at 383-84.
92. VanderVelde, supra note 88, at 821, 895.
93. Larson, supra note 24, at 383.
94. VanderVelde, supra note 88, at 869.
95. Larson, supra note 24, at 404-07.
96. See id at 406-07 (discussing Parker v. Bruner, 686 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984), afld 683 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), in which a woman recovered
damages for emotional harms growing out of a series of misrepresentations over the course
of a two-year sexual relationship).
97. Id. at 393-401.
98. For a full discussion of the genesis of "anti-heart balm" laws, see Nathan P.
Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1935). See also
Larson, supra note 24, at 393-400.
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exchange for access to sexual intimacy without fear of legal censure.99 The post-
seduction norm of nondisclosure represents a degree of complacency with regard
to bald-faced lying that is almost unparalleled in the common law governing tort
and contract.'00 This is surprising given that the law today has adopted many of the
features that were thought to be uniquely problematic about remedying seduction.
For instance, the anti-heart balm movement argued that the pain and
suffering associated with seduction were too susceptible to fraud and
exaggeration.' 0 ' It is true that a plaintiff could fabricate enormous personal
suffering after the end of a relationship to obtain her lover's resources out of
revenge or simply a desire for pecuniary gain. Indeed, popular culture is replete
with terminology that reflects an understanding of humans' capacity for such
behavior (for example, "gold diggers"). 10 2 Nonetheless, the fear that some might
fabricate emotional injuries surely cannot be confined to the broken-hearted. The
same argument may just as readily be raised in all cases of personal injury. The
pain and suffering caused by a negligent driver, for instance, might easily be
exaggerated and even fabricated. Most jurisdictions nonetheless allow litigants to
recover for pain and suffering, some even in the absence of a physical injury,
thereby compensating these "victims" for a similar type of emotional harm. 1
03
In accomplishing its goal of limiting the risk of exaggerated claims, the
anti-heart balm movement simultaneously brought about a remarkable asymmetry
in the law governing intimates. As Professor Larson notes:
The common law protects parties to commercial transactions whose
choices are coerced by violent threats, economic extortion, fraud,
99. For a thorough description of the legal and practical consequences of
repealing the tort of seduction, see Larson, supra note 24, at 412-14.
100. The law tolerates outright misrepresentation in a limited number of other
scenarios, but with far more effort devoted to justifying these cases as exceptions to the rule
requiring honesty in fact. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (discussing cases
in which one party lies about the use of contraception, and as a result, a child is conceived).
Courts invoke public policy justifications for forcing child support payments from the party
who unwittingly was tricked into parenting a child. See, e.g., Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451
N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (Faro. Ct. 1982) (compelling father to pay child support despite his claim
that he was deceived because accepting his claim "would create a new and inferior category
of out-of-wedlock child based upon the circumstances of conceptions..
101. Larson, supra note 24, at 395-96.
102. Id. at 395.
103. Some jurisdictions restrict recovery for the emotional distress suffered to
those who lie within a "zone of danger." See, e.g., Miller v. Chalom, 710 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156
(App. Div. 2000) (discussing the "zone of danger rule"). Other jurisdictions allow recovery
for witnesses outside the zone of danger, but only if there is a sufficiently close bond
between the witness and the victim. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal.
1968). For a solid discussion of the law governing these recoveries, see Dale Joseph
Gilsinger, Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff- Witness as Affecting Right
to Recover Under State Law for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Due to
Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander Plaintiff is Not a Member of Victim's
Immediate Family, 98 A.L.R.5th 609 (2005). See also infra notes 275-78 and
accompanying text (more fully discussing the policies underlying limitations on recovery
for emotional distress).
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and even some careless failures by another party to disclose useful
facts. When a person consents to sex, however, the law permits a far
broader range of coercive practices to distort and manipulate her
choices, including all the psychological and emotional tactics of
deception. To put it plainly, a man may do things to get a woman's
agreement to sex that would be illegal were he to take her money in
the same way. 104
A minority of jurisdictions has attempted to remedy this asymmetry by
permitting legal remedies for sexual fraud.'05 For example, the Illinois Breach of
Promise Act reflects a compromise position that allows recovery of "actual"
damages suffered by the nonbreaching party, 10 6 but bars all punitive, exemplary,
vindictive, or aggravated damages. 0 7 Even this limited recovery is barred in all but
twelve states. 108
The most persuasive argument against permitting the tort of seduction is
that the law should not "force" people into marriage by way of a threatened
seduction action, especially when people often make mistakes in personal
relationships. Of course, the law would not actually force anyone into marriage.
Rather, the party who made a false promise of marriage would have the choice of
paying for the harm caused by the promise or going through with the wedding.
More importantly, the tort of seduction only penalizes those who agree to marry in
bad faith.'0 9 Thus, the real risk of enforcing the tort of seduction is that the trier of
fact mistakenly attributes bad faith to one who has an authentic change of heart.
Although this risk is a valid concern, it exists whenever the trier of fact is
asked to make a choice between two competing versions of an event. Indeed, the
law tolerates this risk of error in other settings where intangible, emotional
damages are recoverable. A plaintiff can feign the emotional damage suffered in
personal injury or intentional infliction of emotional distress cases just as easily as
seduction cases. The tort of seduction may be susceptible to fraud, but there is no
reason to believe that it is more susceptible in this regard than other accepted areas
of law. Fear of the one false plaintiff has led to the denial of recovery for all the
legitimate plaintiffs who have suffered real injuries in reliance upon the promises
104. Larson, supra note 24, at 412 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 401-04.
106. 740 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 15/2 (2004).
107. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/3 (2004).
108. States explicitly barring damages for breach of promise to marry include
California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.4 (West 2004); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207,
§ 47A (2004); New York, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-a (McKinney 2004); and Ohio, OfHO
RvV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (West 2004). It is interesting to note that even in states with
explicit statutory bans, some jurisdictions allow limited recovery under the theory of unjust
enrichment. See, e.g., Jury v. Ridenour, No. 98 CA 100, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3145, at
*9-10 (Ct. App. 1999). For an example of a jilted fiancee allowed to recover damages, see
Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665, 666-67 (S.C. 1984).
109. Larson, supra note 24, at 387 (defining seduction as "means of an intentional
deception[ that causes] the seduced woman [to] yield[] a valuable interest-her consent-
only in reliance on 'deception, enticement, or other artifice."' (quoting Hutchins v. Day, 153
S.E.2d 132, 134 (N.C. 1967))).
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of others. The risks accepted in personal injury law should be no less accepted in
this more critical and fragile area of human interactions.
B. Misrepresentations Regarding One's Fertility and Sexual Health Status
In addition to seduction, several cases have litigated misrepresentations
regarding one's fertility status. These cases typically arise when one party either
fails to disclose, or affirmatively misrepresents, information that bears upon the
other party's need to take contraceptive precautions. For instance, a man might
falsely assert that he had a vasectomy, or a woman might tell her partner that she is
taking the contraceptive pill. Litigation arises when the unwitting partner learns of
an ensuing pregnancy. 10 These cases involve such bold examples of manipulation,
whether by nondisclosure or by affirmative misrepresentation, that the standard
arguments against imposing contract or tort liability simply do not apply."' For
example, a woman who wants to conceive, despite her partner's reluctance, and
therefore lies by telling her partner that she is taking the pill is every bit as
deliberate in her intention to mislead as is the seller of a used car who turns back
the odometer. There is a long line of cases growing out of instances of
nondisclosures and misrepresentations relating to one's fertility status.112
Typically, these cases assert a breach of promise and claim the right to recover
pregnancy- and parenting-related damages and partial or total relief from paying
child support." 3 Courts uniformly have rejected these claims, even when the
parties went beyond the mere failure to disclose and affirmatively lied by telling
110. See, e.g., Erwin L.D. v. Myla Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ark. Ct. App.
1993); Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d 614, 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); C.A.M. v. R.A.W.,
568 A.2d 556, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 682-83
(N.M. Ct. App. 2001); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 714 (N.Y. 1983).
111. In Barbara A. v. John G., a divorce attorney had an affair with his client. 193
Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1983). She informed him of her psychological and economic
reasons not to become pregnant. Id. He represented that he was incapable of fathering a
child. Id. She suffered an ectopic pregnancy. Id. at 425. She needed surgery to save her life
and was rendered sterile by the operation. Id. at 426. She sued, alleging battery and
intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 425. The court allowed her to go forward on these
claims, arguing that California's anti-heart balm statute was meant to prevent so-called
"wrongful life" suits or the avoidance of child support, neither of which occurred here. Id. at
433. This decision was sharply criticized in the dissent and in subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct. App. 1987); Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at
434 (Scott, Acting P.J., dissenting). Both argue that this case clearly falls within the bounds
of California's anti-heart balm statute, which states that there is no cause of action for
"[s]eduction of a person over the age of consent." CAL Civ. CODE § 43.5(c) (West 2004).
Even in the absence of the public policy motivation to support children, these courts would
still allow any lie or abuse of trust to go unpunished under a theory of sexual privacy. Perry,
240 Cal. Rptr. at 405; Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (Scott, Acting P.J., dissenting).
112. Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner's Tort Liability to Other
Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control
Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 301 (1992) [hereinafter Payne, Tort Liability].
113. See id.; see also, e.g,, Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App.
2001). Wallis alleged "fraud, breach of contract, conversion, and prima facie tort" against
the mother of his child to recoup his financial obligations for child support. Id.
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their partners that they were sterile or using contraception.'" 4 Courts have justified
this outcome based on the perceived best interests of the child-whether it be cast
in financial terms or in terms of the emotional harm that would result from
permitting parents to claim that they were harmed by the birth of their child." 5
An alternative outcome, permitting the injured party to sue the other for
costs associated with being duped into parenthood, clearly would have negative
policy implications. Permitting such claims would create an incentive to avoid
child support payments in all cases by fabricating claims that one's partner had
lied about the partner's capacity to reproduce. In effect, this would allow an end-
run around child support laws by permitting the noncustodial parent to recover
child support payments through litigation against the custodial parent. The threat to
children that is inherent in this possibility is so insidious, and the mechanism for
avoiding it is so elusive, that policy reasons alone must militate against allowing
such claims to be brought.
These cases reflect yet another instance in which a norm of nondisclosure
between intimates is tolerated, if not embraced, by the law. The one notable
exception to caveat emptor in the context of intimate partners involves
representations or omissions regarding sexually transmitted diseases. The majority
of jurisdictions require individuals who are infected with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or another sexually transmitted disease to disclose
this information to their partners or face a tort suit for battery. 116 These cases do
not distinguish between outright misrepresentations and the failure to disclose this
information. In both cases, courts impose a duty to disclose, reasoning that the
infected party's silence amounted to an assertion that they were uninfected. 1
7
114. Payne, Tort Liability, supra note 112.
115. The outcome is similar even in cases in which the duped woman elects to
terminate the pregnancy. As there is no child bom in such cases, there is no apparent policy
reason for limiting the damages she might recover. Nonetheless, in the small number of
reported cases, it seems that the woman's recovery will be limited to costs associated with
obtaining an abortion. She will not be permitted a broadly framed recovery for pain and
suffering, including emotional harm, or even such things as the physical changes caused by
the pregnancy or the abortion. See, e.g., Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1982) (Woman who conceived after her lover told her he was sterile terminated the
pregnancy and sued for damages, recovering the costs of the procedure, taxi fare, lost wages
and $150 in pain and suffering); see also Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (distinguishing
damages for the mother's physical injuries from damages for "wrongful birth" and mental
suffering).
116. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Infliction of Venereal
Disease, 40 A.L.R.4th 1089 (1985).
117. See Ray v. Wisdom, 166 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) ("One has
the legal duty to exercise reasonable care by disclosing a contagious venereal disease before
entering into sexual relations with another. In an action for a negligent transmission of a
venereal disease, a person is liable if he knew or should have known that he was infected
with the disease and failed to disclose or warn his sexual partner about this unreasonable
risk of harm before engaging in a sexual relationship." (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original)); see also R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that silence can be a misrepresentation when there is a duty to disclose that one has a
venereal disease).
[VOL. 47:871
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C. Summary
These examples provide striking evidence of the law's tolerance of
nondisclosure in the realm of intimate relations. Yet the embrace of this norm
between intimates is not limited to agreements involving intimacy. Indeed, equally
compelling examples exist in agreements between intimates who are in committed,
long-term relationships, as well as agreements relating to the dissolution of an
intimate relationship.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO CONTRACTS MADE BETWEEN
UNMARRIED COHABITANTS: WINKING AND SCOLDING
For centuries, courts have struggled with issues relating to promises
made, and relied upon, in the context of intimate relationships. In this Part, I will
describe the general pattern of judicial resistance to enforcing agreements made
between intimates involved in committed relationships. I will then examine the
effect that this resistance has on the legal norms regarding truth-telling and
disclosure between such couples.
A. Legal Enforcement of Promises Made in the Context of Committed
Relationships
Legal analysis of promises made within relationships is difficult because
intimate relationships are products of all sorts of contingencies and expectations,
promises and reliance. Intimates offer up their physical and emotional labor as part
of the role they play in the complex web of trades and trade-offs that mark human
relationships. Part of the beauty of family law is that it relieves courts and families
from considering the independent merits and legal enforceability of the myriad
independent "deals" struck between spouses. For example, although sexual
intimacy typically plays a role in marital relationships, there is no need for courts
to consider whether the expectation of sexual intimacy constitutes an exchange of
support or resources for sex.118
This paradigm shifts in the context of unmarried cohabitants, who lack
the safety net of family law when seeking legal enforcement of promises or
agreements." 9 As unmarried cohabitation has become increasingly common,
caselaw in this area has developed rapidly.' 20 Although there are many promises
118. Historically, a wife's obligation to provide sex to her husband was a
presumed element of the marriage contract. In exchange, the husband provided a minimum
level of material support. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage":
Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 1, 3 (2003).
119. Although it clearly is the case that couples can maintain committed
relationships without cohabitation, and that they do, within that context, reach agreements
of all sorts, I have elected to narrow my focus to unmarried cohabitants. Doing otherwise
would pose definitional challenges, which, ultimately, would serve to distract rather than to
underscore my point in this section.
120. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married,
100 CoLUM. L. Rav. 957 967-73 (2000) [hereinafter Dubler, Wifely Behavior] (the doctrinal
foundations of common law marriage in contract and evidence law date back centuries); see
also Sharmila Roy Grossman, Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin v. Marvin for the
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made between intimates in the course of any given day, let alone over the course of
their shared lives, court cases between unmarried cohabitants typically involve
reliance upon promises pertaining to a couple's allocation of present and future
resources.12
The landmark decision involving unmarried cohabitants is Marvin v.
Marvin.122 This much-discussed case deals with the affairs of Michelle and Lee
Marvin, who lived together for seven years. During that time, Lee Marvin acquired
considerable property in his own name. Upon the demise of the relationship, Lee
evicted Michelle from the couple's joint home and denied any obligation to
support her. According to Michelle, the couple had an oral understanding whereby
she would serve as "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook" to the
defendant, and they would act as husband and wife. In exchange, they would
"share equally" in the property they accumulated, and he would support her for the
rest of her life.123 The court accepted her testimony and upheld the legal
enforcement of express contracts between unmarried cohabitants. Furthermore, the
court suggested that, in future cases involving unmarried cohabitants who lacked
express agreements, courts should look to the conduct of parties to determine
whether there was an implied agreement to share resources. Finally, it held that
courts may also award damages in these cases under the doctrine of quantum
meruit. 124
In most senses, Marvin is an enormously progressive decision. It paved
the way for a body of caselaw that permits both same- and opposite-sex couples to
order their personal affairs through the use of private agreements, rather than
relying upon the state's protection via family law.125 Indeed, for same-sex couples
living in states that prohibit them from marrying, private agreements are one of the
few ways to provide for present and future allocation of resources.126
number of adults opting to cohabit rather than marry."). Census data from 2003 reports
more than 4,600,000 unmarried couples of the opposite sex cohabitating nationwide. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIvIsIoN, Opposite Sex Unmarried Partner Households, by
Labor Force Status of Both Partners, and Race and Hispanic Origin/I of the Householder:
2003, CURRENT POPULATION SURvEY, 2003 ANNUAL SocIAL AND EcoNOMIC SUPPLEMENT
tbl.UC1 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/
cps2003/tabUC 1 -all.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 111 (Cal. 1976).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 110.
124. Id. In essence, this means that the court could simply determine that the
defendant was unjustly enriched by virtue of the services rendered by the plaintiff. Thus, the
court could ascertain the value of the services rendered, and permit the plaintiff to recover
those costs. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 21-22 (regarding quasi-contracts).
125. See Ira Mark Ellman, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v.
Marvin: "Contract Thinking" was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1365,
1366 (2001) ("California's choice of a contract remedy was seen as giving options to
partners in intimate relationships, options that would allow each couple to ensure that the
law took proper account of the way they had chosen to fashion their particular
relationship.").
126. See id. at 1365-66.
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However, when it comes to the issue of sex in the context of unmarried
relationships, Marvin fails to resolve the perennial problem courts find in such
"meretricious" relationships. 127 Judges find these cases challenging due to the fact
that the unmarried parties to a now-disputed agreement were having sex, and
therefore there is a risk that some part of their promises may have been made in
exchange for sex. As a result, judges spend time struggling with whether enforcing
the agreement is somehow tantamount to sanctioning prostitution. 12 The Marvin
court sidesteps the "meretricious" problem by noting that, although a contract
predicated upon the exchange of sexual services would be invalid, "[tihe fact that a
man and a woman live together without marriage, and engage in a sexual
relationship, does not in itself invalidate agreements between them relating to their
earnings, property, or expenses." 129 Moreover, the court noted that even if the
agreement rested in part on sexual services, that "illegal" portion of the
consideration could be severed, thus permitting enforcement of the remainder of
the contract so long as there is independent legal consideration. 130
Other courts have been less willing than the Marvin court to
compartmentalize the sexual aspect of the relationship between parties and have
instead used the intimate nature of the relationship to justify their reluctance to
enforce the parties' agreement. This is explicitly the case in the small number of
jurisdictions that refuse to recognize express or implied agreements between
unmarried cohabitants as a matter of public policy.' 3 1 In addition, there are many
jurisdictions that profess their willingness to enforce express agreements between
unmarried cohabitants, and even a willingness to honor implied agreements, but
refuse to enforce any agreements that seem to rest, even in part, on sexual
intimacy.132 The de facto result of this limitation is to create a powerful barrier to
127. See, e.g., In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 710 (Wis. 1980) (Coffey,
J., dissenting) ("I have examined the circumstances cited and can only reach the conclusion
that sexual intimacy, in violation of their marriage vows, was the underlying motivation for
Mrs. Brooks' entry into and stay in the home of the deceased.").
128. Wolf v. Fox (In re Estate of Fox), 190 N.W. 90, 90 (Wis. 1922) ("Courts are
practically unanimous in holding that when a woman voluntarily and knowingly lives in
illicit relations with a man she cannot recover on an implied contract for services rendered
him during the period of such relationship." (citation omitted)). But see Steffes, 290 N.W.2d
at 705-06, 708-09 (stating that the previous quotation from Fox was dicta and holding that
an illicit relationship does not necessarily bar recovery on an implied contract between the
parties).
129. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113.
130. Id. at 114.
131. See, e.g., Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that
an ex-priest had no obligation to support his former nonmarital partner because their
contract was founded on immoral consideration); Samples v. Monroe, 358 S.E.2d 273 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff could not rely on promises made by defendant
regarding wages earned during unmarried cohabitation as sex outside of marriage is illegal
and contracts based on illegal or immoral acts are void); Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding that unmarried cohabitants were not entitled to equity in property
because unmarried people do not have marriage rights).
132. See Katherine C. Gordon, Note, The Necessity and Enforcement of
Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings Will Attach and How to Prevent Them-A State
Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245 (1998-1999) (summarizing the wide variations in state law
895
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recovery for many unmarried parties who relied on the promises of their former
live-in lover.'
It is worth pondering why courts resist awarding even quantum meruit
damages to those whose labors provided undeniable benefits to their intimate
partners. After all, there are myriad cases in which courts have been willing to
grant equitable remedies, whether between strangers or between those who have
known one another for years. A full discussion of quantum meruit recovery in this
setting is beyond the scope of this Article, but the best justification for the refusal
to grant a remedy may be that the services were rendered without any expectation
of compensation. One could argue that intimates are more likely to give gifts to
one another than are strangers. 34 Therefore, one might reason that, in the absence
of an explicit agreement stating otherwise, it is fair to assume that intimates confer
valuable services or goods as gifts.
This solution oversimplifies reality, though, in that the essence of any
committed intimate relationship, within marriage and without, involves a complex
web of promises and obligations. 35 For instance, the work inherent in performing
household chores or caring for a sick partner is not simply given, but is offered up
as part of an exchange that typically is unspoken. 136 The compensation for such
work might involve shared income or emotional support. Far from being gifts, the
services provided by partners to one another are a reflection of a couple's private,
often tacit, agreement about the terms of engagement. Intimate relationships are a
package deal, and they entail all sorts of obligations, spoken and unspoken,
typically including, but not necessarily centered on, sexual relations.
3 7
governing the enforcement of property rights for unmarried cohabitants); see also Morone
v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the court would not imply a
contract between parties because it was "natural that the services were rendered
gratuitously"). Indeed, even in California, Marvin's holding that household labor provides
independent consideration sufficient to bind a promise of financial support was narrowed
and thrown into some confusion by caselaw involving same-sex partners. Consider the case
of Jones v. Daly, in which the parties agreed that Daly would provide an allowance to Jones
in exchange for Jones's services as "'lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion,
housekeeper and cook to Daly."' 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (Ct. App. 1980). In spite of the
powerful precedent of the Marvin case, the California Court of Appeal upheld a finding that
the contract was unenforceable because it was based, in part, upon sexual services. Id. at
133. Ultimately, later California cases discredited the Jones opinion, noting that the portion
of the agreement pertaining to sexual services was severable. See, e.g., Bergen v. Wood, 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 1993).
133. See, e.g., Jones, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130.
134. See, e.g., Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1157 (holding that the court would not
imply a contract between parties because it was "natural that the services were rendered
gratuitously").
135. The following sources provide thoughtful discussion and analysis of the
contractual nature of intimate relations: HiRsHMAN & LARSON, supra note 86, at 3; CAROL
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Perry, supra note 118.
136. See PATEMAN, supra note 135 (providing a thoughtful and thought-provoking
analysis of the unspoken, yet nonetheless ubiquitous, exchanges that underlie heterosexual
relationships).
137. Id.
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Family law anticipates and guards against the harm that can come to those
who rely, to their detriment, upon their spouse's promises. Rather than creating a
similar system of protection for committed unmarried couples, caselaw governing
these disputes often veers off into discussions about the "illegal" nature of these
relationships or the threat such relationships pose to the social fabric.138 Instead of
considering the nature of the agreement and the reasonableness of the parties'
expectations and/or reliance, judges seem to lose their focus, and become
distracted by the thought of sex in the context of a taboo relationship.1
39
B. The Disclosure Problem in Contracts Made in Long-Term Nonmarital
Relationships
Given the reluctance of courts to enforce agreements made between
unmarried cohabitants, it is not surprising to find that there is an equally strong
reluctance to police the problem of nondisclosure in agreements made by those
involved in such relationships. Indeed, the problem of nondisclosure in these
agreements might be seen as merely a subset of the greater issue of enforceability.
Caselaw reveals that the principal nondisclosure problem in this context involves
agreements between unmarried cohabitants regarding property or resources. 140 In
these cases, the law's response to evidence of nondisclosure, or in some cases
evidence of explicit misrepresentation, depends largely upon its comfort with
enforcing the overarching contract. Courts that refuse to recognize even express
contracts between unmarried cohabitants impose no duty of disclosure upon parties
that reach agreements in this setting. 14 1 For instance, when evaluating the
enforceability of a contract made by unmarried cohabitants, courts may find no
duty to disclose material information, even if one party knew that the other was
agreeing to the contract under mistaken premises. 42 These cases typically hold
138. 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY & Louis I. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 100.61, at 100-27 to 100-29 (2d ed. 2003).
139. See, e.g., In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 709-13 (1980) (Coffey, J.,
dissenting).
140. In addition, there are cases involving nondisclosure in agreements relating to
future plans for childbearing. In general, these cases are resolved along the same lines as are
promises relating to one's intentions at the commencement of a sexual relationship. See
supra Part III.A. For example, in Perry v. Atkinson, the defendant impregnated the plaintiff,
his long-time girlfriend. 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 403 (Ct. App. 1987). The defendant persuaded
the plaintiff to have an abortion by assuring her that he would like to have a child with her,
but that he wanted to wait. Id. He promised that he would have a child with her a year later.
Id. The girlfriend alleged that the plaintiff misrepresented himself and that he never
intended to have a child with her. Id. The court rejected her claim, finding that, even if the
defendant deliberately misrepresented his intentions, awarding damages in such cases
"'would encourage unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting the
individual's right to privacy."' Id. at 404 (quoting Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr.
618, 620 (Ct. App. 1980)).
141. See, e.g., Perry, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (finding that even if the defendant
deliberately misrepresented himself, awarding damages in such a case is against public
policy).
142. See, e.g., Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that
an ex-priest had no obligation to support his former nonmarital partner because their
contract was founded on immoral consideration); Samples v. Monroe, 358 S.E.2d 273, 273-
897
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that because the individuals were unmarried, they were not entitled to rely upon
one another as fiduciaries and thus should have bargained with more caution. 1
43
On the contrary, in states that enforce express or implied contracts
between unmarried couples, the law tends to treat nondisclosure as a species of
fraud and misrepresentation. For example, in the Missouri case of Hudson v.
DeLonjay, an unmarried couple acquired considerable corporate assets during their
cohabitation and collaboration.'" Two years before the lawsuit, Marshall Hudson
apparently restructured the parties' joint fifty-percent ownership of their
corporation by allocating ninety-nine percent of the corporation's stock to
himself.145 In addition, the couple's business purchased real estate titled solely in
Hudson's name. 146 At trial, Hudson argued that state law "prohibits the recovery of
damages from a cohabitant based on a meretricious relationship."'147 The court
rejected this argument, finding that based on the couple's alleged "express
agreement to pool resources and share assets accumulated during their
relationship.... the trial court properly could have found ... that the contract was
supported by valid consideration.
' 1
Related to these cases is a relatively new line of cases involving child
custody disputes between unmarried former cohabitants. In such cases, parties
claim rights to children whom they parented while in their former relationships,
but typically, the parent who is biologically or genetically linked to the child
74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff could not rely on promises made by defendant
regarding wages earned during unmarried cohabitation, as sex outside of marriage is illegal
and contracts based on illegal or immoral acts are void).
143. See, e.g., Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that
unmarried cohabitants were not entitled to equity in property because unmarried people do
not have marriage rights). But see, e.g., Cochran v. Cochran, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899, 906 (Ct.
App. 2001) (holding contracts between unmarried cohabitants enforceable provided that sex
is not part of the consideration); Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(same). Interestingly, married couples also may be disadvantaged by this rule, in that the
courts express a preference for family law resolutions even in the face of express contracts.
An example is seen in caselaw governing the spousal interest, upon divorce, in an ex-
partner's graduate degree and future earnings. In Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, the wife agreed to
support the husband through law school, and he would then do the same during her graduate
work. 661 P.2d 196, 199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Shortly after completing law school and
before the wife started graduate school, the couple divorced. Id. The court found that,
although there was an agreement, there was no contract and granted her relief only at equity.
Id. at 200, 207.
144. 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
145. Id. at 926.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 924.
148. Id. at 927. In a colorful example, In re Marriage ofSelvo, a man persuaded a
woman that they should marry but immediately annulled their marriage so that he would be
protected from any future claims of spousal support. 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2208,
at *4-5 (Ct. App. 2003). In spite of his promises that the nullification would have no impact
on their obligations to one another (aside from the issue of spousal support), the man used
this as the basis for his claim that he was solely entitled to all property acquired during their
cohabitation. Id. at *5, *10. The court rejected his claim. Id. at *27.
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asserts sole custody rights. 149 Allegations of nondisclosure or misrepresentation
arise when the excluded party claims that there was an express or an implied
agreement between the parties regarding childrearing, but that the lover secretly
intended to seek sole custody. 50 These cases can generate confusion. Some courts
will treat them as conventional custody battles, looking to evaluate the issue of the
child's best interests, while others will look to enforce the terms of any express
agreement relating to custody. 15' To the extent that courts fail to recognize these
agreements as binding, the law effectively gives parties license to not disclose, or
even to misrepresent, their intentions.
Just as the law tolerates nondisclosure in agreements between unmarried
cohabitants, causing confusion and leaving harms without redress, so too does the
law turn away from evidence of lies and omissions in agreements made at the end
of intimate relationships. In a sense, these cases are even more surprising, as the
underlying facts seldom leave any doubt regarding the parties' intentions to be
bound by their agreements.
IV. CONTRACTS MADE UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF A
RELATIONSHIP: THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE IN PATERNITY-RELATED
SETTLEMENTS
Contracts arising at the dissolution of a relationship tend to be express
bargains, devised to settle some legal and financial matters between individuals
who have decided to separate.1 52 Because these agreements typically are express
promises, made in the language of bargain, they are generally free of the mutual
assent problems that plague other types of agreements between intimates. 53 These
deals often pertain to the settlement of legal claims that one party might have had
against the other upon the termination of the relationship, and as such, they reflect
the parties' determination to settle their claims outside of court. 1
54
149. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136 (Ct. App. 2004), rev'd 117 P.3d
673 (Cal. 2005).
150. For example, in K.M. v. E.G., the plaintiff tried to bring an equitable estoppel
claim against the biological mother asserting that she had encouraged the development of
plaintiff's relationship with the children for years. Id. at 152.
151. See, e.g., id. (in which the lower court held that K.M. lacked rights to her
children, despite the fact that she participated in rearing them and was genetically linked to
them as the egg donor, because, at the time of insemination, she signed express contracts
waiving her parental rights); see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (Ct.
App. 2004), rev'd 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). In contrast, see Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959 (R.I. 2000), in which the Rhode Island family court was given jurisdiction to determine
the child's best interest in allowing visitation with the nonbiological parent.
152. This follows naturally from the alternatives available to parties at the time of
a break-up: sue, walk away from the relationship, giving up any unresolved claims, or
attempt to negotiate a settlement. See, e.g., infra notes 155-221 and accompanying text.
153. See infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing the argument that contracts between
intimates should not be enforceable because the parties did not intend for there to be legal
consequences for their promises, and thus, there is no mutual assent).
154. See, e.g., infra notes 155-221.
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The nondisclosure problem arises in these cases when one party fails to
disclose material information during the course of negotiating the settlement. This
problem may arise between married persons who attempt to separate via a private
agreement rather than an adjudicated divorce. In one case, a woman concealed a
$1,336,000 share in a lottery jackpot from her husband during the divorce
process.155 The court granted the husband all of the lottery winnings in damages.1
5 6
The nondisclosure problem also arises in cases involving "paternity" settlements in
which the putative father discovers that he is not the biological father or the
woman never delivers a baby because of a miscarriage or, in some cases, because
she was never pregnant.1
5 7
These paternity cases provide an excellent opportunity to study the
viability of the norm of nondisclosure in contracts between intimates for two
reasons. First, there is a long history of cases on point, providing an ample record
of the common law development of this problem. Second, judges and litigants in
these cases struggle to articulate justifications for the settled-upon outcome.
Indeed, in approaching these cases, judges have often focused on tangential issues
such as consideration, public policy, or even blackmail, while missing-or perhaps
ducking-the central issue of whether both parties negotiated openly and in goodfaith. 15s
A. Common Law Governing Paternity Settlements
There is a rich common law history interpreting contracts for out-of-court
settlement of paternity claims. Historically, paternity claims brought infamy on the
accused in the form of quasi-criminal charges for bastardy-the crime of fathering
a child out of wedlock.1 59 For hundreds of years, putative fathers of nonmarital
children have used private contracting to protect themselves against the stigma of
bastardy prosecutions, and more recently, to avoid court orders to pay child
support and maintenance.160
155. In re Marriage of Rossi, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 272 (Ct. App. 2001).
156. Id. at 278.
157. See, e.g., Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316, 321 (Md. 1956). The court in Fiege
enforced a contract that forbore a bastardy prosecution even though blood tests determined
that the child in question was not genetically related to the father. Id.; see also Heaps v.
Dunham, 95 111. 583, 590 (1880) (raising the issue of the duty to disclose when the woman
negotiates prior to having confirmed her pregnancy, and later gets her period).
158. See, e.g., Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, Ill. Jun. 12, 2003).
159. Bastardy proceedings were treated as criminal matters, but they actually were
civil in purpose. Most state bastardy laws had, as their purpose, the goal of preventing
nonmarital children from becoming wards of the state. However, as the mothers were the
distinct beneficiaries of these acts, along with the children, bastardy prosecutions were far
more like the enforcement of civil obligations than they were like other criminal
prosecutions. See, e.g., Fiege, 123 A.2d at 321.
160. See generally R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Putative Father's Promise to Support or Provide for Illegitimate Child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500,
512-15 (1968).
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There are two basic approaches to these settlements of legal claims. First,
the contract may involve the father's explicit promise to pay a lump-sum
settlement to the mother in exchange for her promise not to bring bastardy or
paternity proceedings against him.' 61 Second, the father may make an express
promise to provide periodic support for the nonmarital child. 162 Because the
common law did not require fathers to support their nonmarital children, the
second type of contract was vulnerable to claims of unenforceability on the
grounds that it lacked consideration. 163 Nineteenth and early twentieth-century
courts often avoided this problem by the doctrine of moral obligation, reasoning
that the putative father's moral obligation to support the child, combined with his
express promise to do so, constituted sufficient consideration to render the contract
enforceable.164 Modem state laws compelling a father to pay child support furnish
sufficient consideration to create an enforceable contract.1
65
The common law has long recognized that the forbearance of legal claims
is sufficient consideration to support a contract.' 66 Indeed, modem common law
goes further than this. By the mid-twentieth century, courts began holding that the
forbearance of even an invalid legal claim was sufficient consideration to support a
contract, provided that, at the time of contracting, the party surrendering the claim
possessed a good-faith belief that the claim was potentially valid. 167 There are two
primary justifications underlying this rule. First, forbearance of a legal claim is
161. For a review of the numerous courts that enforced support agreements to
forebear a bastardy prosecution, see id. One of the more notable cases on this topic is Fiege,
123 A.2d 316. There the court enforced a contract that forbore a bastardy prosecution even
though blood tests determined that the child in question was not genetically related to the
father. Id. at 323.
162. Gascoyne, supra note 160, at 510.
163. See id. at 519-20.
164. See, e.g., Trayer v. Setzer, 101 N.W. 989 (Neb. 1904); Todd v. Weber, 95
N.Y. 181 (1884). Not all courts accepted the notion that moral obligation constituted
sufficient consideration. The following cases rejected this theory, and found for the
defendants on the grounds that such contracts lacked consideration: Davis v. Herrington, 13
S.W. 215 (Ark. 1890); Wiggins v. Keizer, 6 Ind. 252 (1855) (reported as 6 Ind. 201 on
LEXIS); Mercer v. Mercer, 7 S.W. 401 (Ky. 1888).
165. Fiege, 123 A.2d at 320.
[W]here statutes are in force to compel the father of a bastard to
contribute to its support, the courts have invariably held that a contract
by the putative father with the mother of his bastard child to provide for
the support of the child upon the agreement of the mother to refrain from
invoking the bastardy statute against the father, or to abandon
proceedings already commenced, is supported by sufficient
consideration.
Id. (citing Beach v. Voegtlen, 53 A. 695 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1902); Thayer v. Thayer, 127 S.E.
553 (N.C. 1925); Jangraw v. Perkins, 60 A. 385 (Vt. 1905)).
166. See, e.g., Brooks v. Haigh, 10 Ad. & E. 323, 113 Eng. Rep. 124 (Ex. 1840)
(holding that the surrender to the guarantor of a written guarantee was sufficient
consideration to bind the guarantor to his promise to pay, even if the original guarantee was
unenforceable owing to the statute of frauds). See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 3, at 180.
167. CALAMARJ & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 180 & n.5.
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consideration because it represents one party's agreement to refrain from acting
upon a legal right.'6 Therefore, it constitutes a legal detriment. The party who
bargains for this detriment benefits by avoiding the costs of litigation, which can
impact that party's money, reputation, time, and emotional health. A defending
party must often endure these costs regardless of whether the claim ultimately
prevails. 169 Indeed, even successful defendants must pay the costs of defending
litigation.170 As such, even the release of a legal claim that ultimately proves
invalid may constitute valuable consideration.171 The second justification for
enforcing these contracts is public policy favoring out-of-court settlements.
72
B. Paternity Settlements and the Problem of Nondisclosure
The problem of nondisclosure can be raised by the subset of paternity-
settlement cases in which a putative father promises money to a pregnant woman
in exchange for her waiver of legal claims, only to learn some time later either that
the woman was not (or was no longer) pregnant, or that he was not the child's
father.' 73 In these cases, the man generally challenges the contract on grounds of
168. See Fiege, 123 A.2d at 321 ("In the early part of the Nineteenth Century, an
advance was made from the criterion of the early authorities when it was held that
forbearance to prosecute a suit which had already been instituted was sufficient
consideration, without inquiring whether the suit would have been successful or not."
(citing Longridge v. Dorville, 5 B. & Aid. 117, 106 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B. 1821))).
169. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1567, 1569 (1993). Rule 54(d)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs .... "
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The U.S. Code limits this rule to costs numerated in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920, which excludes attorneys' fees-typically the largest expense in litigation. 28
U.S.C. § 1920 (2000). For an interesting discussion of the policies that shape cost awards,
see John M. Blumers, Note, A Practice in Search of a Policy: Considerations of Relative
Financial Standing in Cost Awards Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), 75
B.U. L. REv. 1541(1995).
170. Vargo, supra note 169, at 1569.
171. Fiege, 123 A.2d at 323.
172. See Stanspec Corp. v. Jelco, Inc. 464 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1972); Cent.
Kan. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1529, 1536 (D. Kan. 1995); Messer v.
Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 11 N.W.2d 727, 731-32 (Iowa 1943); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74, cmt. a (1981) (discussing public policy).
173. See, e.g., Heaps v. Dunham, 95 I11. 583 (1880); Thompson v. Nelson, 28 Ind.
431 (1867); Pflaum v. McClintock, 18 A. 734 (Pa. 1889); T.J. Oliver, Annotation,
Avoidance of Lump-Sum Settlement or Release of Bastardy Claim on Grounds of Fraud,
Mistake, or Duress, 84 A.L.R.2d 593, 595 (1962) ("It appears that in accordance with the
principles applicable to settlements and releases in general, a lump-sum settlement or
release of a bastardy claim may be avoided on the grounds for fraud, duress, or mistake."
(footnote omitted)). The issue of the duty to disclose also is raised in cases in which the
woman negotiates prior to having confirmed her pregnancy and later gets her period. Heaps,
95 I11. at 590. Theoretically, it might also be relevant in cases in which the settlement is
negotiated very early in the pregnancy, and the woman later either miscarries or has an
abortion.
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fraudulent misrepresentation or mutual mistake.174 Many of these cases have been
filed in recent decades, as blood-typing and DNA technology can now provide a
putative father with irrefutable evidence of nonpaternity. 1 5 Perhaps the most
comprehensive opinion on this issue is found in Fiege v. Boehm, a 1956 Maryland
decision. 176 That case involved a suit by Hilda Louise Boehm against Louis Gail
Fiege for breach of his promise to support a child that he purportedly fathered.
177
Although he denied having had sexual relations with Ms. Boehm, Fiege promised
to pay her birth-related expenses and provide ten dollars per week for child support
until the child reached the age of twenty-one in exchange for Boehm's promise not
to bring a bastardy claim against him.' 78 Fiege made various payments for two
years following the child's birth, after which newly available blood-typing
technology established that he could not have fathered the child.
179
Without the support payments, Boehm ultimately relinquished her three-
year-old child for adoption.' 8 After losing her bastardy case, Boehm sued Fiege
on the underlying contract, claiming that she had refrained from bringing bastardy
charges in exchange for and reliance upon Fiege's promises of support.18' In
response, Fiege contended that the contract was unenforceable because the
bastardy claim was invalid and thus could not constitute adequate consideration.'g2
The Fiege court's analysis began with British law, noting that early
common law distinguished between "good" and "bad" claims, and held that a
promise to refrain from bringing a bad claim was not sufficient consideration.
18 3
Later cases, encouraging the settlement of claims, altered the doctrine to render
legally enforceable a promise to forbear further legal action on a suit that already
had been instituted, regardless of whether the suit ultimately would have been
successful. 84 By the mid-nineteenth century, it was clear in both England and the
United States that forbearance on even a doubtful claim would constitute
consideration, provided the parties thought there was a bona fide legal claim
between them at the time of contracting.'85 In light of these findings, the Fiege
court held that a promise not to prosecute an invalid claim may constitute
174. See, e.g., Heaps, 95 111. 583 (claiming fraud); Thompson, 28 Ind. 431 (same).
175. Such testing has become so established that courts tend to show little
sympathy to putative fathers who failed to avail themselves of it prior to acknowledging
paternity and beginning to pay child support. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d
488 (Mass. 2001) (denying relief to a father who paid child support for several years before
challenging the paternity judgment).
176. 123 A.2d 316 (Md. 1956).
177. Id. at 318.
178. Id. at 318-19.
179. Id. at 319-20.
180. Id. at 319.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 320.
183. Id. at 321.
184. Id. (citing Longridge v. Dorville 5 B. & Aid. 117, 106 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B.
1821)).
185. Id. (citing Hartle v. Stahl, 27 Md. 157, 172 (1867); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 76(b) (1932)).
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consideration provided there is both a subjective belief shared by the parties in the
potential validity of the claim, and that belief is objectively reasonable.
1 86
This holding makes it plain that "[iut is immaterial whether defendant was
the father of the child or not."'187 Likewise, the court rejected the assertion that
these cases reflect a form of extortion or duress, in that a man may feel compelled
to enter into the contract because he fears harm to his reputation.'8 8 On the
contrary, the Fiege court reasoned that:
The fact that a man accused of bastardy is forced to enter into a
contract to pay for the support of his bastard child from fear of
exposure and the shame that might be cast upon him as a result...
does not lessen the merit of the contract, but greatly increases it.'8 9
In support of this claim, the court cited several cases involving
"paternity" settlements in which the woman never delivers a baby, either due to a
miscarriage or because she never was pregnant. 90 In these cases, the woman
nonetheless is permitted to recover on promises to pay a lump-sum settlement,
simply because, at the time they reached the settlement, both parties shared a
good-faith belief that the woman was pregnant and that their deal would avoid her
seeking judicial recourse against the man.191 In all of these cases, the men had
other choices when they agreed to, or even proposed, these out-of-court
settlements. To the extent that they were skeptical about the baby's paternity, they
could have challenged the mother's assertion by pressing her to promise that she
had had no other sexual partners during the relevant timeframe. If the mother made
such a claim, and then was later shown to have lied, their contract clearly would be
voidable due to her misrepresentation. 1
92
In addition, the man simply could have waited for her to bring suit and
required her to prove, in court, her charges that he was the father of her child.' 93 A
third alternative emerged once paternity testing became available. Blood-group
186. Id.
187. Id. at 323.
188. See id. at 322.
189. Id. (citing Hays v. McFarlan, 32 Ga. 699 (1861); Hook v. Pratt, 78 N.Y. 371
(1879)).
190. Id. at 361-62 (citing Heaps v. Dunham, 95 Ill. 583, 590 (1880); Thompson v.
Nelson, 28 Ind. 431 (1867); Pflaum v. McClintock, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889)).
191. See, e.g., Heaps, 95 Il1. at 590 ("[Tjhere is great doubt from the evidence
whether [Dunham] was pregnant, yet so far as the charge of bastardy is concerned, as
complainant voluntarily settled and gave his notes in settlement of the prosecution which
had been commenced against him, he must be concluded by that settlement."); see also
Thompson, 28 Ind. 431; Pflaum, 18 A. 724.
192. "If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a
material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying,
the contract is voidable by the recipient." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) Or CONTRACTS § 164(1)
(1981).
193. This sort of claim necessarily would be raised in the context of a bastardy
prosecution. William E. Nelson, The 2002 Kormendy Lecture: Authority and the Rule of
Law in Early Virginia, in 29 Ofno N.U. L. REV. 305 (2003), at 325-27 (describing the
weaknesses of such laws in early colonial America).
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testing to possibly exclude paternity began in the 1940s, and modem DNA testing
can now establish paternity to a very high degree of certainty. 94 Men accused of
fathering a child can insist on a paternity test prior to agreeing to pay any money in
support of the child. Thus, this line of decisions reasons that the men freely entered
into these bargains, motivated perhaps by the desire to avoid stigma or shame and
also by a sense of moral obligation to the mother. 195 Regardless, the mother's
agreement not to pursue legal action is sufficient consideration to uphold these
bargains.1
96
This line of cases also enshrines a norm of nondisclosure. After all, the
men in these cases relied, to their detriment, on the women's assertions that the
men had impregnated them.197 Had the women disclosed that they had other lovers
during the relevant timeframe, these men might have altered their bargains
dramatically. Thus, the law endorses the traditional norm of nondisclosure by
failing to require disclosure of this material information.
C. Contemporary Discomfort with "Nonpaternity" Paternity Settlements:
Alternatives to Enforcement
Even though these contracts regarding the surrender of invalid legal
claims are supported under the traditional contract law doctrine of consideration,
as any professor who has taught Fiege v. Boehm in a first-year Contracts course
will agree, these cases are nonetheless controversial. 98 This discomfort exists even
in commercial cases. 99 Hindsight typically reveals these deals to be unfavorable to
194. See generally DANIEL L. HARTL, A PRIMER OF POPULATION GENETIcs (3d ed.
2000); ALEXANDER S. WIENER, BLOOD GRoUPs AND TRANSFUSION 7-34 (3d ed. 1943); Alf
Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L. REv. 466
(1958); E. Donald Shapiro, Stewart Reifler & Claudia L. Psome, The DNA Paternity Test:
Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1 (1992-1993); Jule B. Greene,
Comment, "Blood Will Tell!," 1 MERCER L. REv. 266 (1950); Lewis R. Williams, Jr.,
Comment, Evidence-The Use of Blood Grouping Tests in Disputed Parentage
Proceedings-A Scientific Basis for Discussion, 50 MICH. L. REv. 582 (1952); John A.
Yantis, Comment, Blood Test Exclusions as Decisive Evidence of Nonpaternity, 24 ROCKY
MT. L. REv. 237 (1952).
195. See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text.
196. See Gascoyne, supra note 160, at 510 ("At the present time, when statutes by
which a putative father may be compelled to aid in the support and maintenance of his
bastard child are generally in force, the courts have less difficulty in finding a legal
consideration for contracts of this character, for unquestionably the impending likelihood of
being compelled, by legal proceedings, to make provision for the support of an illegitimate
child furnishes a sufficient consideration for a voluntary contract to provide for the child,
and thus escape prosecution, which is usually one of the objects of the agreement.").
197. See, e.g., Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316 (Md. 1956).
198. The case appears in at least two popular first-year Contracts casebooks: JOHN
D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADiyANNAKIs BENDER, CASES AND PROBLEMS
ON CONTRACTS 206 (4th ed. 2000); EDWARD J. MuRPHY, RIcHARD E. SPEiDEL & IAN AYRES,
STuDms IN CONTRACT LAW 75 (6th ed. 2003).
199. See, e.g., Aviation Contractor Employees v. United States, 945 F.2d 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Wickman v. Kane, 766 A.2d 241 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). Although the
modem view is that "the surrender of an invalid claim serves as consideration if the
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the party who has paid a settlement rather than risking a lawsuit that is later
exposed as baseless. 200 It seems the party who relinquished the legal claim
procured the deal unfairly, perhaps by threatening the other party with litigation.20 '
In addition, often the relinquishing party knew that the legal claim was invalid.20 2
These concerns are enhanced in the context of paternity-related settlements, where
the nature of the charges is inflammatory, and the woman is in a much better
position to assess the potential validity of her claim of paternity than the man.
Thus, students recoil against Boehm's recovery as an unfair victory.
Perhaps another reason for their discomfort stems in part from the fact that the
women involved in these contracts are unmarried and "promiscuous," in that they
had more than one sexual partner at more or less the same time. This is not to
suggest that law students are particularly prudish in their sexual sensibilities, but
rather that, perhaps due to the stultifying effects of the first-year law school
experience, or perhaps due to the tendency of law students to find and follow rules,
they tend to judge harshly those who are not playing by the rules of monogamy
that ostensibly govern sexual relationships. 20 3 When I teach this case, I attempt to
explore whether students' frustration with the outcome stems from their objection
to Boehm's sexual behavior or her contracting behavior. I ask whether Hilda
Boehm still would have been able to recover on the contract if she had had several
lovers during the month she conceived, or even several dozen lovers. The class
does not like my answer, which is, so long as she possessed a good-faith belief that
the man with whom she entered into the settlement was in fact the father of her
child, the contract is valid.
I follow this line of inquiry by asking whether, assuming that she had two
lovers in the month during which she conceived, she could have entered into two
separate contracts settling prospective paternity claims, one with each lover. This
question directly addresses the possibility that she was not acting in good faith. If
she entered into the two contracts without disclosing to either man that she had an
equally compelling belief that another man could be the father, each contract might
be invalid because she did not possess an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief
that the particular man was responsible for her pregnancy. 204 These contracts
claimant has asserted it in good faith and a reasonable person could believe that the claim is
well founded," this view is not unanimous. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 3, at 186.
200. See, e.g., Fiege, 123 A.2d at 319 (finding the defendant contractually
obligated to pay child support for a child that was later determined not to be biologically
related to him).
201. See, e.g., Heaps v. Dunham, 95 11. 583, 586 (1880) (noting that Heaps was
told by Dunham that "unless a settlement was made he would be prosecuted for rape and
seduction, in addition to the charge of bastardy then pending").
202. E.g., id. at 590 (finding that "there is great doubt from the evidence whether
[Dunham] was pregnant").
203. Of course, there is a remarkable gap between monogamy on the books and
monogamy in practice! Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 284 (2004) (providing a
fascinating discussion of the legal enforcement of monogamy-related norms).
204. Recall that the Fiege case turned on the fact that the judge found that Hilda
Boehm held a good-faith belief that Louis Fiege had impregnated her, in spite of the fact
that she had had more than one lover during the relevant timeframe. Thus, evidence of
906 [VOL. 47:871
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would be on a firmer footing if she had told each of the men that she had a good-
faith belief that there was a fifty-percent chance that he was the father of her child.
Seen from this perspective, what remains disconcerting about the contract
between Fiege and Boehm is the suspicion that Hilda Boehm was less than candid
with Louis Fiege when she asserted her belief that he had impregnated her.
Students are not alone in finding the "nonpatemity" paternity settlement cases
problematic. Consider the outcome in a more recent rendition of this fact pattern: a
case involving the famous basketball player, Michael Jordan, and a woman with
whom he had an extramarital sexual relationship, Karla Knafel.20 5
In the winter of 1989, Michael Jordan, then a newly married professional
basketball player on the verge of worldwide stardom, pursued an intimate
relationship with Karla Knafel, an aspiring singer and model.20 6 Like Jordan,
Knafel was intimately involved with another at the time of their affair.20 7 After a
series of unprotected sexual encounters, Knafel became pregnant. 20 8 According to
Knafel, when she informed Jordan that she was pregnant, he asked her if she was
sure that he was the father.20 9 She replied that she believed that he was, and Jordan
offered to pay her $5 million when he retired from professional basketball in
exchange for her refraining from "going public" about their relationship or suing
him for paternity.210 Knafel accepted his offer and neither publicized her story nor
pursued a paternity action against Jordan.2 n
When Knafel's baby was born, in July 1991, genetic tests revealed that
Jordan was not the child's father.212 Nonetheless, he subsequently reaffirmed his
deal with Knafel. 213 In the winter of 2001, when Jordan's retirement became
nonmonogamy need not, standing alone, preclude one from forming a good-faith belief as to
paternity.
205. Jordan v. Knafel, 823 N.E.2d 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
206. Id. at 1116.
207. Amended Verified Answer and Counterclaims of Karla Knafel at 8, Jordan v.
Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Feb. 7, 2003) ("Early in Karla's and
Jordan's relationship, she had told him that she was dating and sleeping with another
man.").
208. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1116.
209. Amended Verfied Answer and Counterclaims of Karla Knafel, Jordan, supra
note 207, at 9 ("Jordan asked her if she was sure, and she replied that she believed the baby
was his. Although Jordan knew about Karla's relationship with the other man, he did not
challenge her belief.").
210. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1117.
211. Id.
212. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143, at 5 n.2 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill.
June 12, 2003).
213. Id. It is worth noting that this may have been strategically wise, given what
he gained from her silence. First, her silence enabled him to maintain his image as a
wholesome family man, which surely helped secure his lucrative advertising contracts with
companies like Nike and Gatorade. In 1991, in addition to his $2.5 million annual salary
from the Chicago Bulls, Michael Jordan earned between $6 million-$8 million per year
endorsing products for companies such as Nike, Chevrolet, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and
Wheaties. Chuck Stogel, The 100 Most Powerful People In Sports; CHAIN REACTION;
Impact of CBS' Spending Spree Makes Tisch Most Potent, THE SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 7,
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imminent, Knafel's attorneys contacted Jordan with regard to his debt to her.214
Jordan responded by suing Knafel for extortion.215 Knafel's attorneys responded
with a counterclaim for breach of contract.21 6 Trial judge Richard Seibel dismissed
the case, finding that the deal between them was an unenforceable effort on her
part to secure "hush money., 21 7 The contract was held void as against public
policy.
218
Judge Seibel's opinion echoes the sensibilities of my first-year students
that there is something unseemly about seeking judicial enforcement of a contract
predicated upon the relinquishment of an invalid legal claim. The legal foundation
for the opinion, however, is far from solid. Rather than directly addressing the
process of contract formation and the concern that Knafel was not sufficiently
forthcoming about her other partner when negotiating the paternity settlement with
Jordan, he viewed the bargain as an illegal effort on Knafel's part to procure
money from Jordan.219 In situating their bargain within the context of blackmail,
Judge Seibel found that Jordan and Knafel's out-of-court settlement was
"extortionate" and thus void against public policy.220 This approach yielded the
desired effect of avoiding enforcement of a deal the court found distasteful.22 '
Nonetheless, it is legally untenable and useless in charting the boundaries of other
222intimate relationship contracts.
1991, at S-2. At the end of the 1990s, Jordan's peak celebrity years, his annual
endorsements earned him $16 million from Nike alone. See DAN WETZEL & DON YAEGER,
SOLE INFLUENCE: BASKETBALL, CORPORATE GREED, AND THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICA'S
YOUTH 5 (2000), excerpt available at http://www.powerbasketball.com/soleinfluence.html.
214. Amended Verified Answer and Counterclaims of Karla Knafel, Jordan,
supra note 207, at 12.
215. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1116.
216. Id. at 1115.
217. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, I11.
Jun. 12, 2003).
218. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1115.
219. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill.
Jun. 12, 2003).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. It would seem that the Illinois appellate court agrees with this assessment, as,
in February 2005, it overturned the decision and remanded the case for trial. Jordan, 823
N.E.2d 1113. The facts underlying the Jordan-Knafel agreement reveal that it could not
have amounted to extortion because the agreement was not the result of a threat by Knafel,
but, rather, was proposed by Jordan. For more on the significance of threats in establishing
extortion or blackmail, see George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 1617, 1621-23 (1993). Nor did the resulting deal, in particular Knafel's promise
to refrain from publicizing the affair, violate public policy. She had a legal right to sell her
story, just as Jordan surely had a legal right to attempt to buy her story from her. The
resulting agreement therefore was little more than a garden-variety out-of-court settlement.
Nor was the agreement flawed due to mutual mistake. In this case, both parties either were
aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the risk of a mistake of fact. More
importantly, the famous case of Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), in which
-rescission of a contract was permitted on the grounds that neither the seller nor the buyer of
a "barren" cow even suspected that it could be fertile, is essentially dead law. See Lenawee
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Ironically, both the Knafel-Jordan and the Feige-Boehm deals could have
been resolved much more persuasively had the judge applied the basic rules that
govern the duty to disclose in other contractual contexts. For instance,
nondisclosure by a party to a contract for the sale of goods would trigger concerns
regarding bad faith and perhaps even a breach of warranty. 223 Under the common
law of torts and contracts, Knafel's nondisclosure might have qualified as a
material misrepresentation, permitting Jordan to rescind the agreement or seek
damages. 224 It is this resistance to imposing a duty to disclose in contracts between
intimates that I will explore in the following Part.
V. EFFICIENCY, FAIRNESS, AND THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE BETWEEN
INTIMATES
The irony of the judicial resolutions of the Knafel-Jordan and Fiege-
Boehm deals is that neither court applied the basic rules of contract formation that
would govern in almost all nonintimate settings. Specifically, the parties seemingly
were exempted from the common law duty to disclose information in cases in
which one party is aware that the other is operating under a "mistake ... as to a
basic assumption" on which the negotiations are based.225
Recall that the law's abandonment of caveat emptor and embrace of a
broader norm favoring disclosure were driven by a conviction that considerations
of both efficiency and fairness demand that, to the extent possible, parties
negotiating agreements should do so on equal footing.226 When one party conceals
material information, there is an imbalance in the power between the parties that
can undermine the fairness of the resulting contract. The seeming retention of
caveat emptor when the parties are intimates, rather than strangers, suggests that
the law has a different calculus of the underlying risks in such cases.22 However,
the justifications that support a broader duty of disclosure in arm's-length contracts
apply with equal, if not greater, force in the context of agreements between
intimates.
County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Mich. 1982) (confining Sherwood
to its facts). In another case, Wood v. Boynton, the court refused to rescind the sale of a
"pretty stone," which turned out to be a valuable diamond, holding that both parties took the
risk that the stone might be more or less valuable than the contract price. 25 N.W. 42, 44
(Wis. 1885). What is critical to the outcome of the Jordan case is that both parties knew that
paternity had not been verified, and could not be until after the child's birth. Thus, in
keeping with contemporary law governing mutual mistake, rescission will not be permitted.
223. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 1-304, 2-312 to 2-318 (2005).
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) oFTORTS § 551 (1977).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 161(b); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1(e).
226. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
227. Indeed, in some cases the law goes farther than merely permitting
nondisclosure, enforcing promises predicated upon affirmative misrepresentations. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text (regarding the abolition of the tort of seduction).
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A. Barriers to Gathering Material Information Between Intimates
One might argue that the difference between the commercial setting and
the intimate setting is that the material information in commercial cases may be
difficult or expensive for the ignorant party, typically the buyer, to unearth. Indeed,
this calculus is the basis for the contemporary theories explaining the viability of
Laidlaw v. Organ and the justification for requiring sellers, but not buyers, to
disclose material information pertaining to the value of a specific commodity or
property.
228
Expanding upon this reasoning, one might argue that, as with sellers, any
information that is "material" to intimates is readily accessible to both parties by
communicating. Thus, the law should not require disclosure of material
information by either party, but instead, should encourage the parties to proceed
cautiously, taking care to protect themselves from exploitation due to their own
ignorance. A closer examination of the actual context in which intimates negotiate
agreements shows this supposition is unfounded. Instead, there are marked
barriers, both practical and psychological, to eliciting information that is vital to
the integrity of the contract.
1. Practical Barriers to Eliciting Material Information Between Intimates
The practical barriers to gathering material information in bargaining
between intimates are most easily understood by considering the role of truth in
the process of negotiating access to sexual intimacy. For instance, how might a
person ascertain the truth about a partner's assertions regarding contraception? It
would not be practical for laypeople to investigate whether their partners are taking
the pill or had surgery to prevent conception. Laws protecting patient
confidentiality prohibit doctors from responding to inquiries about contraception
229
and fertility from a patient's partner. In contrast, in other contexts, such as the
228. For instance, Professor Kronman's theory about the viability of buyer
nondisclosure is predicated upon the difference between "deliberately" acquired information
and that which is "casually acquired." One might be said to have a property right in the
former, having invested resources in order to obtain such information. Thus, a rule
mandating disclosure of information obtained by a deliberate search might be viewed as
depriving the person who invested resources of her "property." Kronman, supra note 12, at
15. His solution was to endorse a norm of nondisclosure only in those cases in which it was
reasonable to assume that the information at issue was acquired deliberately, through an
investment of resources, as opposed to "casually." Id. at 18; see also supra note 7
(explaining Professor Barnett's alternative theory for justifying nondisclosure in exceptional
cases).
229. There are various legal theories that safeguard the confidentiality of medical
information. These include common law rights stemming from tort law, fiduciary duty, and
breach of contract. For an excellent summary of the law governing the confidentiality of
medical information, see I BARRY R. FURROWET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 4-32 to 4-33, at 150-
55 (2d ed. 2000). See also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 533-36
(Or. 1985) (brief discussion of relevant caselaw). In addition, federal and state statutes
protect the confidentiality of this information. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.3025 (West 2005); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2004).
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purchase of property, one might seek information from the seller's neighbors or
acquaintances. In this case, former sexual partners, even if they are known, are not
necessarily a reliable source of information about a new partner (who is, of course,
their ex-partner).
The only realistic option is to have a candid discussion with one's partner
and hope for full disclosure. As the following Subpart will explain, there are
enormous psychological barriers to conducting such a conversation, let alone to
ascertaining whether a partner is telling the truth.
2. Psychological Barriers to Eliciting Material Information Between
Intimates
Let us consider the psychological context of negotiations between
intimates by returning to the context of the contract negotiation between Fiege and
Boehm. When Hilda Boehm told Louis Fiege that she was pregnant with his child,
there were many questions he could have asked her that would have triggered her
duty to disclose that she had another lover. There is no reason to doubt that he
would have found this information material to his willingness to promise to
support the child. Two questions arise: why didn't he ask the right questions, and
why didn't he know, or even suspect, that she was lying?
As to the first question, intimate relationships are generally distinct from
other human experiences, such as buying a car. Although it may be unwise,
common sense dictates that individuals tend to be far more trusting of their lovers
than they are of used car dealers. Recent studies bear out this proposition.
230
Perhaps the best evidence of this comes from studies involving high-risk
sexual activity and the failure of those who know about the risks of unprotected
sexual contact to take precautions against the transmission of HIV and other
sexually transmitted diseases.23 ' Numerous investigators have explored the
problem of HIV transmission among young people, and their findings yield
interesting insights into interpersonal conmunication in the context of sexual
relationships. 32 First, studies demonstrate that risk perception is not a purely
objective evaluation, but rather, it can be influenced by the context in which the
subject gauges his risk. 33 When that context involves a sexual relationship, studies
indicate that, despite accurate knowledge about the risks of unprotected sex, "the
construct of trust within [the] sexual relationship[] is an issue that frequently
overrides the threat of HIV infection .... ,,234
This tendency to trust, or to underestimate risk, may be compounded by a
phenomenon known as psychological maintenance, whereby "people inaccurately
230. See Lisbeth G. Lane & Linda L.L. Viney, Toward Better Prevention:
Constructions of Trust in the Sexual Relationships of Young Women, 32 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 700, 709-11, 714 (2002); see also Trace S. Kershaw et al., Misperceived Risk
Among Female Adolescents: Social and Psychological Factors Associated with Sexual Risk
Accuracy, 22 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 523 (2003).
231. See Kershaw et al., supra note 230, at 523.
232. Id. at 524.
233. Id.
234. Lane & Viney, supra note 230, at 700 (citing studies).
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perceive their risk because acknowledging self-destructive behavior damages
psychological well-being (for example causes anxiety and threatens self-,,235
esteem). In essence, psychological maintenance theory posits that it can be
distressing for an individual to acknowledge the extent of risk she faces in a sexual
236relationship. As a result, individuals may be inclined to grossly underestimate
their risks, thus preserving "romance" and "ideals of exclusivity.
237
In light of these findings, one can surmise that it would have been
decidedly uncomfortable for Louis Fiege to ask Hilda Boehm whether she had
other lovers. In the context of a casual sexual relationship in the 1950s, asking
Boehm about other lovers might have insulted her by suggesting that she was
promiscuous.238 Moreover, Fiege may not have wanted to know whether Boehm
had other lovers before him. Even when pursuing a relatively casual connection,
intimacy involves making oneself vulnerable to another, allowing the other to
come closer than arm's-length. One places one's ego on the line, risking ridicule
and rejection, in the hopes of some greater gratification.
Perhaps the agreement between Fiege and Boehm should be treated
differently because it occurred at the end of the relationship rather than during it.
One might suppose that there would be less psychological inhibition and a greater
inclination to protect one's own interests in an "exit" agreement. Interestingly,
psychological research does not bear this out. Instead, particularly in the context of
divorcing women, it seems that there are numerous psychological and contextual
inhibitions that undermine the ability to negotiate at arm's-length.239 Professor
Penelope Bryan has written extensively on the problems of coercion and
exploitation in divorce settlements, illustrating the manner in which naive trust and
the traditional roles played by each spouse during the marriage contribute to the
tendency for wives to accept a poor settlement.24 °
235. Kershaw et al., supra note 230, at 524.
236. Id.
237. Lane & Viney, supra note 230, at 700 (citing R.F. Galligan & D.J. Terry,
Romantic Ideals, Fear of Negative Implications, and the Practice of Safe Sex, 23 J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1685 (1993)). I do not mean to suggest by this that either Louis Fiege or
Michael Jordan were starry-eyed romantics in the context of the sexual relationships that
gave rise to their respective paternity settlements. Nonetheless, the fact that Michael Jordan
refused to use a condom when engaging in extramarital relations is indicative of an
extraordinary level of risk-denial. Not only was he courting the risks of pregnancy, fathering
an out-of-wedlock child, and destroying his public image, but also, given that this was 1991,
he could not have been unaware that he was risking acquiring HIV and other STDs. In
1991, approximately one million people were infected with HIV nationwide, and the
Centers for Disease Control had been tracking the disease for ten years. David Johnson,
Timeline: AIDS Epidemic, http://www.infoplease.cornspot/aidstimelinel.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2005).
238. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. PosNER, SEX AND REASON 248-50 (1992) (noting
American disapproval of promiscuity).
239. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Women in Divorce Settlement
Negotiations, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 931, 932 (1997) [hereinafter Bryan, Coercion].
240. See Bryan, Coercion, supra note 239 at 932; see also Penelope Eileen Bryan,
Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1153 (1999) [hereinafter Bryan, Women's].
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Although there are many contractual contexts that might require
uncomfortable questions, it is the emotional connection between the parties that
distinguishes agreements between intimates from ordinary cases involving hard
bargaining. When an individual buys a used car, there is no mistaking that a
transaction is taking place. The key to maximizing one's self-interest is keeping
focused on the transaction at hand.24 ' As a result, one operates at arm's-length,
specifically aiming to avoid the vulnerability that can come with an emotional
attachment to a contracting partner.242 Indeed, a good salesperson might attempt to
extract a more favorable deal by confusing the buyer into believing that they are
"friends." Common sense dictates that the goal of maximizing self-interest is more
difficult to pursue when one cares deeply about the person with whom one is
negotiating, even if the negotiation takes place at the end of a complex
relationship. Thus, there is vulnerability inherent in almost any effort to negotiate a
contract with a sexual intimate.
Indeed, this inhibition may have been a factor even in the contract
negotiation process between Jordan and Knafel. Although their relationship seems
to have been a discreet affair, it is conceivable that Jordan felt uncomfortable
pressing Knafel about the details of her sexual relationships with others. According
to Knafel, he asked only if she was sure that the pregnancy was his, and he did not
request paternity testing.243 It may be that Jordan failed to inquire about Knafel's
other lovers because that information simply did not matter to him. Once it became
clear that she was willing to go public about their relationship, he may have
decided to do whatever he could to stop her.244
241. This point is perhaps most clearly illustrated through a consideration of the
distinctions between classical contract formation theory and relational theory. For a succinct
overview of the manner in which relationships to one's contracting partner may alter the
contracting process, see Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. GIN.
L. REv. 1283 (1990).
[lin relational contracts other common contract norms, such as
maintaining the integrity of one's role within the relation and
harmonizing the relation with the surrounding social matrix, are more
important because of the more extensive characteristics of relational
exchanges.... In addition, the [relational contract] framework brings to
light certain features of many exchanges that neoclassical law
undervalues or ignores because of its emphasis on relatively discrete,
value-maximizing agreements. Values other than wealth maximization
figure importantly in exchanges. ... because the non-economic, non-
market aspects of relations pervade market transactions. Sometimes
relations are not mutually favorable to all parties because they arise out
of social situations of inequality, so the values may include elements of
coercion and dependence, contrary to the neoclassical assumption of
rough equality. In other situations, values such as trust, cooperation,
reciprocity, and role integrity are essential to the relationship.
Id. at 1302.
242. See id.
243. Amended Verified Answer and Counterclaims of Karla Knafel, Jordan,
supra note 207, at 9.
244. Jordan's clean public image was vital to his lucrative endorsement business.
Contracts for product endorsements typically contain morals clauses, in which "the
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In addition, Jordan's failure to inquire about paternity may also have been
evidence of the power of "psychological maintenance." Recall that studies suggest
that the stronger one's self-image and self-confidence, the more powerful the
individual's drive toward psychological maintenance, and hence, toward risk
denial.245 Either way, because Jordan asked only whether Knafel was certain about
paternity, her good-faith response that she was sure, having checked with her
physician about the likely timing of conception, likely was enough to protect her
from liability for misrepresentation.246
Perhaps the more important question, then, is why Louis Fiege did not
suspect, let alone know, that Hilda Boehm was keeping a secret from him. One
explanation is that Fiege, like all of us, was overly sanguine about his ability to
know when he was being lied to. Empirical evidence indicates that people are not
very accurate in judging when someone is lying, including professionals whose
jobs require them to make credibility judgments. 24 A second explanation may lie
in the social construction of trust in close relationships. Relationships are
predicated upon a "willingness to trust," so the more "Hobbesian" expectations
that one might harbor about people in general are cast aside when it comes to an
intimate.248 Even though they were negotiating the terms of their separation, Fiege
might have believed that he could trust Boehm to be fully honest because they
were still in the relationship.
Considered from this perspective, the psychological barriers to gathering
material information in negotiating agreements with intimates are at least as
formidable as are any economic barriers in the nonintimate setting. Indeed,
considering the likelihood that we are unaware of our misplaced tendency to
assume we can detect lies, coupled with our resistance to pressing our partners for
full disclosure because so doing risks harm to our relationships and, perhaps even
company reserves the right to cancel the contract in the event the athlete does something to
tarnish his or her image and, consequently, the image of the company or its products." Steve
Carlin, Forget What (Kobe 's) Commercial Says, Image is Everything, FORT WORTH Bus.
PRESS, Sept. 3, 2003, available at http://www.legalpr.com/9-3-03stevecarlindavismunck.
html.
245. See, e.g., Kershaw et al., supra note 230, at 523; Carla Willig, The
Limitations of Trust in Intimate Relationships: Constructions of Trust and Sexual Risk
Taking, 36 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 211, 220 (1997).
246. See E. ALLEN FARNswORTH, CONTRAcTs § 4.12, 258 (2d ed. 1990) ("In
addition to scienter, there must be intent to mislead.").
247. See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo, Julie I. Stone & G. Daniel Lassiter, Deceiving
and Detecting Deceit, in THE SELF AND SOCIAL LIFE 323 (Barry R. Schlenker ed., 1985)
(demonstrating individuals' tendency to overestimate truthfulness in attempting to
distinguish truth from lies); Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?,
46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913 (1991) (examining the ability to detect lies).
248. Willig, supra note 245, at 218 (in intimate relationships, trust maintains the
relationship as well as functions as a guarantee for safety from HIV); see also Steven A.
McCornack & Malcolm R. Parks, Deception Detection and Relationship Development: The
Other Side of Trust, 9 CoMm. Y.B. 377, 388 (1985) (people in intimate relationships are
more likely to presume their partner is truthful).
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worse, to our egos, intimate relationships seem to render individuals particularly
vulnerable to deception. 249
B. Testing the Conventional Disclosure Justifications in Agreements Between
Intimates
If one agrees that the emotional proximity between intimates inhibits the
ability to obtain full disclosure of material information, then one must
acknowledge that such inhibition likely affects the contracting parties' access to
material information. Because the justification for retaining the rule permitting
nondisclosure rests on the assumption that both parties have ready access to
material information, evidence regarding the obstacles to obtaining such
information suggests that we must reconsider the viability of this distinction.
There are psychological obstacles to obtaining full disclosure between intimates
that are equivalent to the economic obstacles in an arm's-length transaction.251 The
rule that there is no duty to disclose material information in negotiations between
intimates suggests that intimates are better able than those in arm's-length
transactions to protect themselves from exploitation. In fact, the opposite is true.
Instead, intimates are primed for deception in the relationship setting.252 They
incorrectly believe they are able to detect lies, and they avoid asking too many
questions for fear of destabilizing the "trust" in the relationship 253 or their own
mental health.254 Romantic partners fail to negotiate defensively, and, as a result,
they often form agreements based upon false assumptions.
Yet the question remains whether the law should intervene to protect
intimates who fail to protect themselves. In answering that question, one can focus
either on the process by which a contract is negotiated, or on its substance. A focus
on process might lead one to conclude that the law should not intervene because
the barriers to obtaining full disclosure in negotiations between intimates tend to
be emotional and intangible, rather than structural, as in the case of, say, insider
trading.255 Individuals are not unable to negotiate defensively with an intimate, but
249. See Lane & Viney, supra note 230, at 701 ("[W]hile unprotected sex might
be seen as a token of trust, and a choice in favor of enhancing the relationship, assessment
of partner risk can be inaccurate, thus placing f women at risk of HIV." (citing A.C. Morrill
et al., Safer Sex: Social and Psychological Predictors of Behavioral Maintenance and
Change Among Heterosexual Women, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 819
(1996))).
250. See supra Part I.C. I (discussing policy justifications for an expansive duty to
disclose in arm's-length transactions).
251. Black's Law Dictionary defines "arm's-length" as "[o]f or relating to
dealings between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and who are
presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship
<an arm's-length transaction does not create fiduciary duties between the parties>."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 103 (7th ed. 1999).
252. See Lane & Viney, supra note 230, at 701. See generally Kershaw et al.,
supra note 230, at 524.
253. See Lane & Viney, supra note 230, at 701.
254. See Kershaw et al., supra note 230, at 524.
255. For a definition of structural inequality, see KM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL
SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENcY IN THE COMMON LAW 120-21 (1988). See also Victor
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rather, psychological factors predispose them to being uncomfortable, and
therefore they are unwilling to do so.
256
However, the broader law governing the duty to disclose is not limited to
remedying structural knowledge barriers. 5 Courts routinely impose a duty to
disclose upon sellers where the material information might have been readily
discovered by a more industrious or simply more inquisitive buyer.2 5 8 The most
important and relevant of these contexts involves contracts made between parties
who are involved in a fiduciary or a confidential relationship.259 Regardless of the
definitional distinctions that govern these relationships, it is clear that, "as a
general matter, courts impose a heavier disclosure obligation in cases where the
relation between the parties could be considered fiduciary or confidential, such as,
for example, a familial or marital relationship, than they do when the parties share
a merely arms-length relationship. 260
To date, courts have not extended the doctrine of confidential
relationships to include those who are sexually intimate but neither married nor
engaged. The central justifications for failing to do so mirror the general
arguments made against extending rights to unmarried cohabitants.26' In other
words, there are those who might argue that the rights and privileges of marriage
must be reserved to those whose relationships are legally sanctioned. The doctrine
of "confidential relationships" dates from an era in which the only legal sexual
relationships took place within the confines of marriage.262 Today, as is amply
demonstrated by the plethora of cases involving unmarried cohabitants and issues
such as "gay divorce," there is no plausible basis for such an assumption.
26 3
A more plausible justification, then, is that the law requiring a higher duty
of care in dealing with "confidants" is a special privilege, which should not be
extended to those who engage in sexual intimacy outside the confines of marriage.
But such a position situates judges as moral arbiters, forcing them to ignore the
underlying merits of the claims brought to them by parties who relied,
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322 (1979).
256. See Feinman, supra note 241, at 1302.
257. The theory that the law requires disclosure of material facts in cases of
unequal access to information is most powerfully articulated by Kim Lane Scheppele. See
SCHEPPELE, supra note 255, at 120-24.
258. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 307, 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 1970).
259. See Krawiec & Zeiler, supra note 57, at 4, 16, 19, 59, 60.
260. Id. at 19.
261. Cf Jonathon D. Hurley, Note, Loss of Consortium Claims by Unmarried
Cohabitants in the Shadow of Goodridge: Has the Massachusetts SIC Misapprehended the
Relational Interest in Consortium as a Property Interest?, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV. 163, 194-
95 (2004).
262. Rachel F. Moran, How Second-Wave Feminism Forgot the Single Woman,
33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 223, 235-36 (2004) (discussing the limited rights of unmarried women
historically, and providing a rich discussion of the historical tendency of the law to accord
protection to women in the context of marriage).
263. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988); Doe v.
Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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understandably and to their detriment, upon the promises of their lovers. This was
the dilemma faced by the Marvin court, and, as noted above, the overwhelming
majority of courts now reject the highly moralistic position that courts should not
enforce any agreements made by unmarried cohabitants on the grounds that such
relationships violate public policy.
264
A final justification for resisting the expansion of "confidential
relationship" protection to unmarried couples might be definitional in nature. That
is, without the marriage requirement, it is not clear which couples would qualify as
"confidants." Should the fact that a couple had sex create a legal duty to act in
each other's best interests? Could this obligation be triggered by a single sexual
encounter?
In spite of the definitional uncertainty, it seems self-evident that marriage
is a poor proxy for identifying relationships in which one finds a level of trust that
renders one vulnerable to deception. Surely, one might readily imagine cases in
which an estranged married couple would have far less justification for relying
upon each other's representations than would a romantically inclined unmarried,
noncohabiting couple. If the law is to be consistent in its mission to protect those
who are vulnerable to deception, then it must provide at least a cursory factual
inquiry into the nature of the emotional connection between the parties.
Regardless of how the law classifies confidential relationships, a
heightened duty of disclosure between intimates might be justified on both
procedural and substantive grounds. For instance, although it is true that family
members could negotiate contracts with great vigor, undertaking rigorous
investigations and interrogations of one another, such an investigative process
might be more costly than it would be in a nonintimate relationship. First, some
information that is material to an agreement, such as medical information, might
be unobtainable at any price. In addition, as noted above, intimate partners tend to
be unsuspecting and therefore are more easily misled or put off-guard. 265
Moreover, the corrosive effects of such an inquisition on the relationship place
external costs on the contracting process-costs that are less salient when
bargaining with those with whom one has neither a prior relationship nor the
expectation of any future relationship.
Thus, efficiency also should be considered in setting a duty to disclose in
contract negotiations between intimates. For instance, although it is true that
Michael Jordan could have asked Karla Knafel if she had additional sexual
partners, it would have been far more efficient to simply require her to disclose
that material information when negotiating a paternity settlement,
Perhaps the best justification for imposing a heightened duty to disclose
on partners in all confidential relationships is the substantial fairness of the
264. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also Della Zoppa v. Della
Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 907 (Ct. App. 2001) (a contract "is not totally invalid merely
because the parties may have contemplated creating or continuing a sexual relationship");
Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Colo. 2000) ("[C]ohabitation and sexual
relations alone do not suspend contract and equity principles.").
265. See supra notes 234-36, 246-47 and accompanying text.
917
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situation. All confidential relationships are predicated upon trust, not just those
relationships recognized as "confidential" by the law. Thus, those engaged in
intimacy are vulnerable to exploitation from a self-interested partner. As such,
standard contract formation principles that encourage parties to maximize their
own self-interest fail when applied to intimates who are emotionally entangled.266
Courts achieve the goal of substantive fairness in contract formation by imposing a
heightened duty of disclosure upon those who would be tempted to take advantage
of their partner's trust.267
The problem with imposing a duty to disclose material information in
contracting between intimates is not that such a duty would be unfair or unjust, but
rather, that requiring truth-telling between intimates might be unworkable. The
standard justifications of efficiency and fairness that have brought about the
expansion of a duty to disclose in other contexts apply with equal force when
considering agreements between intimates. The question that remains, then, is
whether there are other justifications for retaining a norm of nondisclosure
between intimates, when it has been rejected as outmoded in virtually all other
contexts.
VI. ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETAINING A NORM OF
NONDISCLOSURE BETWEEN INTIMATES
There are perhaps two alternative justifications for permitting intimates to
form binding agreements without requiring that they make good-faith disclosures
regarding material issues. The first is the ease of adjudication that comes with
retaining a bright-line rule. The second is that intimate relationships should be sui
generis and separate from the law. Thus, any agreements made between those who
are romantically involved exist in the proverbial shadow of the law and should not
be bound by prevailing legal norms or mores. In this Part, I will discuss, and
ultimately reject, both of these justifications.
A. Strict Liability has Good Policy Consequences
One plausible argument in favor of applying a norm of nondisclosure
when evaluating agreements formed between intimates is that, even if it does not
comport with the general rules governing contracts and torts, it generates
beneficial policy consequences. By refusing to use the force of law to require
disclosure, the law generates a sort of strict liability in the context of bargaining
with an intimate. For instance, if the law required disclosure, then in almost every
case involving an unmarried father's objection to child support obligations the man
could claim that his partner led him to believe that she was taking oral
contraceptives and therefore breached her duty to disclose that she was not using
contraception. As a result, he might claim that he was duped into fathering a child
266. See generally Feinman, supra note 241, at 1285, 1299 (discussing the
distinctions between relational and neoclassical contract theory).
267. Palmieri, supra note 20, at 127 ("When a confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties, the party who owes the confidential or fiduciary duty
has an obligation to divulge or disclose during negotiations all material facts concerning the
transaction within his knowledge." (footnote omitted)).
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and that he should not have to support it.268 Alternatively, he might seek damages
against his former partner for breach of promise or perhaps for misrepresentation.
But for these policy reasons involving offspring, the argument for a duty
to disclose in these cases is strong. There is no disputing the materiality of
representations regarding one's capacity to conceive, particularly when relied upon
by a partner who does not wish to become a parent. Therefore, it would seem that
the reasons for not obligating parties to disclose such information are driven not by
law, but rather, by policy considerations.
In the vast majority of cases, the resulting litigation would be bad for the
child. A long and costly legal battle would impede the process of obtaining
necessary child support. Any financial recovery for the father would, by definition,
reduce the amount of monetary support available to the child. In addition, many
courts have argued that children are harmed by litigation in which a father argues
that the child was unwanted and that he was tricked into paternity.269
Ascertaining the truth is yet another problem in such cases. It will be
difficult, after the fact, to determine the veracity of the man's claim that the
woman implied that she was using contraception. 27 0 The problem of proof is so
great that the claim of a failure to disclose could be raised in defense against
virtually all claims to child support by unmarried women. Thus, although it is
certain that the "strict liability" approach traps some men who are honest in their
claims of having been tricked into paternity, it protects against a seemingly
inevitable and profoundly negative policy outcome inherent in the alternate policy.
The only just reason we do not hold parties to the duty to disclose is that
there are overriding policy reasons that dictate a different remedy. In the vast
majority of agreements formed between intimates, the policy reasons militating
against liability for nondisclosure are far less evident than they are in other
contexts. Consider, for example, the range of agreements discussed in this Article:
promises to marry, promises pertaining to disease status, promises regarding
allocation of resources, and separation agreements. Permitting parties to form these
268. The father could also bring a claim against the mother for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as Dr. Richard Phillips recently did against his former lover,
Dr. Sharon Irons. See Court: Man Can Sue for Distress Over Surprise Pregnancy, but
Sperm Were Hers to Keep, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2005; Karen Mellen, Deceptive
Conception Alleged by Dad's Suit; Plaintiff Says Woman Saved His Semen, Cmu. TRW., Feb.
25, 2005, (Metro), at 1. Phillips claimed that Irons secretly kept semen after they had oral
sex and used it to get pregnant. He learned about the child nearly two years later, when
Irons filed a paternity lawsuit. DNA tests confirmed Phillips was the father and he was
ordered to pay child support. Phillips claims that Irons betrayed and deceived him by using
his semen to get pregnant, and that she lied to him about her marital status when they began
their relationship (telling him she was divorced, when she was only separated from her
husband). The trial court dismissed his claim, but the appellate court reinstated it.
269. See, e.g., Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). For
an overview of this general policy, see Payne, Tort Liability, supra note 112; Anne M.
Payne, Annotation, Parent's Child Support Liability as Affected by Other Parent's
Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth Control, or Refusal to
Abort Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R.5th 337 (1992) [hereinafter Payne, Child Support Liability].
270. After all, typically, there are no witnesses to intimate sexual encounters.
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agreements without fear of liability for nondisclosure, or even misrepresentation, is
not necessarily a wise policy decision. Nondisclosure in separation agreements or
agreements regarding the allocation of resources may unfairly deprive a trusting
partner of much-needed support or property. 271
In the absence of compelling policy reasons, such as harm to a child, the
advantages gained by permitting nondisclosure between intimates are readily
offset by the harms occasioned. 272 Between intimates, as between strangers, there
should be a duty to disclose material information in forming agreements, and
courts should impose liability upon those who fail to do so.
B. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
The second justification offered in favor of permitting nondisclosure, if
not outright misrepresentation, in agreements made between intimates is that the
law should not interfere with intimate relationships. This argument takes on
varying forms, depending upon whether one seeks to establish contract liability or
tort liability.273 Regardless of the legal form that the argument assumes, the core
spirit reflects the notion that the law should recognize a zone of sexual privacy
within which individuals are free to act without the fear or inhibitions that would
follow from legal consequences.
Discussions about liability arising out of agreements made between
intimates are closely connected to questions about the nature of damages that
might be sustained in the intimate setting. Prior to discussing liability, then, it is
important to identify and set aside the issue of damages. Part of what makes
agreements between intimates controversial is that the damage sustained in the
event of breach often is emotional in nature.2 74 As such, these agreements trigger
the legal system's ongoing concerns about the problems with awarding damages
for emotional distress. As Douglas Whaley notes, "The law of emotional distress
271. See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988); Blake
v. Stradford, 725 N.Y.S.2d 189, 192-93 (Dist. Ct. 2001) (holding that petitioner could evict
his ex-domestic partner because the property rights bestowed in legal marriage do not apply
to cohabitants); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same-sex
domestic partners "acquire no automatic claims to property from cohabitation" (quoting
Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983))); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d
1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002).
272. The law already recognizes the negative consequences of permitting
nondisclosure (let alone misrepresentation) by those who would expose their partners to
sexually transmitted diseases. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text; infra note
302. Mandating disclosure in these cases generates positive policy consequences-
diminishing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases by penalizing those who fail to
disclose the threat they pose to others. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; infra
note 303.
273. This Subpart discusses this claim as it relates to breach of contract claims.
See also Larson, supra note 24, at 439-42 (discussing tort liability growing out of similar
fact patterns).
274. See, e.g., supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the harms
generated by seduction).
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damages is in a state of flux in tort cases, and in a state of chaos in contract
ones."
275
Concerns pertaining to emotional damages are overblown and
inapplicable, particularly in the context of contract claims. In the context of tort
law, courts fear that permitting recovery for emotional distress might trigger an
endless set of claims by plaintiffs far removed from the relevant injury, yet
nonetheless "harmed" by it.276 In contrast, contract law governs only those who
assent to being governed.277 The focus in remedying a breach of contract is on
making the nonbreaching party whole by protecting expectation, reliance, or at the
very least, restitution interests.278 Consistent with the common law anxiety
regarding emotional damages, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts expresses
hesitation on the topic of such remedies:
Loss Due to Emotional Disturbance: Recovery for emotional
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily
harm or the contract of the breach is of such a kind that serious
emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.
279
Upon reflection, there is little logic behind the limitation on emotional
damages. As Douglas Whaley forcefully argues:
[T]he breaching party to a contract intentionally assumed must bear
the full burden of the harm caused, and there should be no exception
for emotional distress damages.... Where the facts are compelling,
when the defendant's breach is outrageous, if the emotional harm is
so likely that in effect we can take judicial notice of it, then our
sense ofjustice demands a recovery. We are not redressing a fiction;
in these cases the harm is real and must be paid for by whomever
caused it.
280
Setting aside for the moment any concerns regarding the emotional nature
of the harm done when intimates break promises to each other, I turn now to the
question of whether promises made within the "zone of privacy" should be legally
binding.
1. Mutual Assent
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against imposing a duty to disclose
in deals between intimates arises when one subjects these agreements to scrutiny
under the laws governing contracts. A standard prerequisite to contract formation
is the requirement of mutual assent: both parties to a contract must have
275. Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional
Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 947 (1992).
276. Id. at 948.
277. This is reflected in the law of mutual assent, which requires an objective
manifestation of assent for the formation of enforceable contract. See generally JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERuLW ON CONTRACTS 26-28 (5th ed. 2003).
278. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
279. Id. at § 353.
280. Whaley, supra note 275, at 948-49.
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objectively manifested the intention to create a binding legal obligation. 28' In
essence, those invoking this maxim argue that there is no mutual assent in
promises whispered across the pillow-partners simply do not intend their private
promises to be legally binding. The problem with this argument is that it proves
too much. It may be true that some promises made between intimate partners are
characterized by intense, yet ephemeral emotionality, devoid of any lasting
significance, let alone of an intention to be bound. It also may be true that, when
the negotiations involve the goal of furthering intimacy (for example, "If you stay
with me, I promise I'll love you forever"), the parties to such "bargains"
understand that these are just words, or at least that the law will not intervene to
enforce such promises. Yet there is no reason to believe that these "fatal flaws"
characterize all contracts between intimates. Nor does it necessarily follow that the
presence of heightened emotions precludes one from forming the intention to enter
into a binding promise.
The critical distinction between legally enforceable contracts and
promises lacking legal force lies neither in the extent to which the parties are
intimately involved nor in the nature of the contract's object. 28 3 Instead, the law of
mutual assent is quite explicit in providing that it is the mindset of the parties at the
moment of making a promise that dictates enforceability. 284 The objective theory
of contract places the focus on the mindset of the party to whom the offer is made.
If offerees are reasonable in understanding their partners' promises to carry legal
weight, then they should be permitted to recover damages for breach.28 5
This distinction should help alleviate the concerns of those who maintain
that attaching liability to promises made between intimates would occasion
disaster, or at least the demise of sexual relations.28 6 For example, contract liability
281. PERILLO, supra note 277, at 26.
282. See Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You": A
Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REV. 311, 401 (1995) (arguing that a tort of
sexual fraud is ill-conceived due to the prevalence of dishonesty in intimate relationships).
283. Of course, this is not true for contracts that have an illegal purpose, such as
contracts to exchange money for sex. PERILLO, supra note 277, at 843.
284. Id. at 29-30. Ordinarily, mutual assent is established by the process of offer
and acceptance. Id. at 26.
285. Id. at 26-30. If an objective, reasonable person would not have believed the
offer was serious, then no offer was made and there is not manifestation of intent to enter
into a contract. See, e.g., Leonard v. PepsiCo, 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (a
reasonable person would not have believed Pepsi was giving away military fighter jets as
part of its promotion).
286. Such hyperbolic objections tend to be raised whenever suggestions are made
for reforming the rules surrounding sexual relationships in order to limit the harm done to
vulnerable parties. Consider, for instance, the hue and cry raised by efforts to combat date
rape on campus. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REv. 663, 688
(1999) ("People like Professor Gilbert reject reform proposals [like the Antioch College
Sexual Offense Policy] that require affirmative assent because he says they reduce romantic
interaction to 'cool-headed contractual sex."'); see also Subotnik, supra note 282, at 401
("[If we recognize sex fraud, o]ne thing will almost surely be lost: that sensuous striptease
in which we slowly and deliriously reveal our indissolubly entangled real and imagined
selves to our partners-and then hope for the best."); id. at 409 ("[S]exual players need
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would not attach when a partner procures consensual sexual relations by saying,
"I'll have sex with you if you promise that you love me." Not only does this
exchange involve sex as consideration (thereby rendering it illegal), but also, it
raises a mutual assent problem in that no recovery can be had unless it was
reasonable to think the promisor intended legal consequences.28 7 On the other
hand, a jury might find that a party was reasonable in assuming that a cohabiting
partner's promise to share living expenses was legally binding.
There are many agreements made between intimates in which one party's
consent is induced by the other party's silence, or even misrepresentation, of a
material fact. The only question the law of contracts need ask is whether the
injured party was reasonable in assuming that the breaching party intended to
make a legally binding promise. In the event that the parties manifested mutual
assent, there is no legitimate reason for refraining from imposing the standard rules
of contract law, including the duty to disclose. Far from creating problems for the
courts, or for couples, this rule clarifies matters by bringing these contracts into the
fold of mainstream common law, which has long since abandoned the doctrine of
caveat emptor and embraced a broad duty to disclose. 288 The result is greater
efficiency in contract formation and performance in that the availability, ex ante,
of all material information enables couples to negotiate an agreement that best
benefits their mutual and individual needs.
2. The Zone of Sexual Privacy: Can and Should the Duty to Disclose Be
Cabined?
A central theme in arguments against requiring disclosure between
intimates is that lying, or at least exaggerating, is fundamental to the nature of
intimate relationships. 28 9 This argument is related to the "no mutual assent"
argument in that it evolves from a fundamental claim that the law does not belong
in the proverbial bedroom.290 But it extends beyond this, in that it posits that
seduction and other human "mating rituals" are sui generis and cannot be likened
to bargaining in other contexts. Therefore, the argument goes, the rules simply
should not apply, and instead, there should be a zone of privacy surrounding the
291sexual realm, into which the law cannot penetrate.
This position might be justified on several grounds. One might contend,
as do some commentators, that lies, or affirmative misrepresentations, permeate
human sexual interactions and are so prevalent as to be harmless.292 The "lies" told
space from one another, and... if they do not get it, they and all around them should watch
out for falling pillars[.]").
287. See PERILLO, supra note 277, at 26-31 (discussing the objective theory of
contract).
288. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
289. Subotnik, supra note 282, at 406.
290. Id. at 349-63.
291. Id. at 388-93.
292. See, e.g., id. at 361 (citing JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SEDUCTION 42 (Arthur
Kroker & Marilouise Kroker eds., Brian Singer trans., 1990)).
In sum, our examination of sexual relationships has revealed that lying is
a pervasive, and perhaps even desirable, element whose origin lies in the
HeinOnline  -- 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 923 2005
924 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:871
in the context of sexual relationships are not truly lies, they reason, because we all
understand that romantic human interactions are full of half-truths.2 93 After all,
poses Subotnik, "Who among us has not also, like our love-crazed heroes,
misrepresented himself in love?, 294 He points to Camille Paglia for support "that
everything in romance is lying and delusion and that judgment goes out the
window in sexual matters., 295 Professor Jane Larson notes Judge Richard Posner's
comments "on the 'exquisite difficulty' of litigating the distinction between an
initially false statement of one's sexual or romantic feelings and a later change in
those feelings." 296 She also notes Camille Paglia's assertion that "[tihe element of
free will in sex and emotion is slight. As poets know, falling in love is
irrational.
297
The problem with this assertion is that it seems to be unfounded. Indeed,
if we all understood the baseline in intimate relationships to be one of falsehoods,
rather than truths, then it would seem that we would cease to believe the false
claims made by our intimate partners, and their lies and omissions would cease to
mislead us. Instead, human experience tells us that they work time and again,
much to the detriment of the party who is misled.298 The core meaning of the
assertion that "everything in romance is lying and delusion, 299 then, is the claim
that one ought to be permitted to lie without fear of legal consequence. My
response is that this is true only insofar as no reasonable person would have
understood the promise (or in this case, the lie) as one that anticipated legal
consequences.
never-ending conflict between the need of Homo Liber to decide for
himself or herself what to do and say, and that of Homo Ludens, to play
with others.
Id. at 362.
293. Id. at 349-63.
294. Id. at 314.
295. Id.; see also id. at 402-03 ("[Tlhe immense obstacles in the way of
establishing a sex fraud regime [include]: our deep need to trump up our accomplishments;
our need for privacy; the interplay in our mental lives between fact and fancy; [and] the
difficulties of interpreting language, particularly in high-tension contexts .... " (citations
omitted)).
296. Larson, supra note 24, at 451.
297. Id. at 452.
298. For a somewhat sensationalistic take on this problem, see DORY HOLLANDER,
101 Lfis MEN TELL WOMEN: AND WHY WOMEN BELIEvE TiEM (1995). For a grim depiction
of the effectiveness of "pick up lines" on younger women and girls, see Michelle Oberman,
Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM L. &
CRIVNOLOGY 15, 54-68 (1994). In 1993, a group of teenage boys calling themselves the
Spur Posse developed a "game" in which members scored points for each sexual conquest.
Id. at 53-54. With one exception, the alleged victims had consented to sexual intercourse.
Id. at 54. The boys reported they gained girls' consent through flattery. Id. This illustrates
the collective findings of numerous studies of teenage girls' psycho-social development:
that many factors combine to make teenage girls particularly vulnerable to flattery. Id. at
55-68.
299. Subotnik, supra note 282, at 314 (quoting Shulamith Gold, Don Juan in
Court, Cmi. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at N1 (quoting Camille Paglia)).
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A related claim offered in support of the zone of privacy is that the
imposition of a duty to disclose would dramatically rewrite interaction between
intimates, opening the proverbial floodgates of litigation and casting a dismal pall
over all intimate relationships. 300 Katharine Baker has written of the severe
criticism of the Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy, which requires the verbal
consent of one's partner before moving to higher levels of sexual intimacy:
Antioch's policy was widely mocked by a variety of influential
media sources. Time Magazine called it "extreme." George Will
worried that "hormonal heat [would] be chilled by Antioch's grim
seasoning of sex with semicolons." ... [A]nd Newsweek, in a cover
story article, complained that the Antioch Policy "seem[s] to stultify'
relationships between men and women on the cusp of adulthood."3
Of course, over the last several decades, courts have created limited
duties of disclosure between intimates, apparently without occasioning the demise
of human sexual interaction. For instance, there is ample caselaw permitting
recovery in tort for the failure to disclose the fact that one has a sexually
transmitted disease. 0 2
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of a zone of sexual
privacy is that there is a powerful trend in contemporary law that militates against
government intervention into or regulation of sexual activity. This may be
observed in the outcome of Lawrence v. Texas, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two people of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause.
30 3
300. See Subotnik, supra note 282, at 392-93.
301. Baker, supra note 286, at 687 (footnotes omitted).
302. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (creating a
cause of action for the tortious transmission of genital herpes under Alabama law),
overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Gen. Motors Corp., 769 So. 2d 903, 909 (Ala. 1999);
Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (App. Div. 1986) (finding it a misdemeanor
in New York to have sex with another knowing that you have a sexually transmittable
disease); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 214 (N.C. 1920) (holding that a wife may sue
her husband for transmitting a venereal disease to her); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d
265, 270 (Ohio 1989) (finding that "a person who knows, or should know, that he or she is
infected with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain from sexual conduct or, at the
minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or she expects to have sexual relations of
his or her condition"); Panther v. McKnight, 256 P. 916, 917-18 (Okla. 1926) ("[A]ny
person who shall, after becoming an infected person[,] marry any other person or expose
any other person by the act of cohabitation or sexual intercourse to such venereal disease,
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years."); De Vail v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d
245, 246-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (finding right of action for woman induced to sleep with
man who gave her crab lice).
303. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government.
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Additional evidence of this trend is seen in the lack of enforcement of adultery and
fornication laws. °"
All of this reflects a change in the moral fabric of our culture. Indeed, this
shift might be witnessed in the two paternity cases contrasted in this Article. At the
time of Fiege v. Boehm, there was little doubt that Louis Fiege made a valid
contract when he promised to support Hilda Boehm's child.30 5 Had he not agreed
to do so, he would have faced a quasi-criminal prosecution for bastardy, and his
reputation, as well as Ms. Boehm's, would have been greatly impaired. 6 By
contrast, Judge Seibel's willingness to view Knafel's accusation as an effort at
blackmail presupposes an ability to sympathize with Michael Jordan, rather than
condemning him for having had an extramarital affair.30 7 Unwed motherhood is an
accepted reality in contemporary society.30 8 Likewise, infidelity is not simply
commonplace in contemporary society; it has lost much of its moral stigma.3 0 9 As
such, Seibel's concern about what he termed a "hush money" deal was not, as it
might have been in the 1950s, whether Jordan had offered money in exchange for
Id. at 578.
304. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 10 CARDozo
WoMEN's L.J. 311, 313 (2004); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Pergatory for Sexual
Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1107, 1128 (1996);
Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REv.
943, 970 (1999).
305. This owes both to the fact that the common law was settled regarding the
surrender of invalid claims as consideration, and also to the fact that Fiege willingly
assumed the risk of nonpaternity when he entered into the contract with Boehm. See
PERILLO, supra note 277, at 186-88, 365 n.27.
306. For a discussion of the prosecution of bastardy, and the social and legal
consequences of conviction, see JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF
BASTARDY (1982).
307. See Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill.
Jun. 12, 2003).
308. In 2003, the most recent year for which statistics are available at the time of
publication, 34.6% of all births in the United States were to unmarried women. Nat'l Ctr.
for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Fastats: Out-of-Wedlock
Births, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2005). Given
these numbers, it is easy to understand why society in general, and the law in particular, has
tempered its former severity toward nonmarital births. Consider, for example, the Uniform
Parentage Act, the prefatory note to which states that the purpose of the Act is to provide
"substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of their parents."
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT prefatory n. (2002); see also IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA S.
McLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 116
(John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., 1986).
309. Consider the long-dormant laws against fornication, which once served to
police against extramarital sex. See generally 2 AM. JuR. 2D Adultery and Fornication § 1
(1994). For a provocative discussion of contemporary efforts to revive long-forgotten laws
banning fornication, see Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1 (1999).
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preserving his reputation. 10 Instead, Seibel saw only the possibility that Jordan
had been blackmailed into paying Knafel.
311
The prevailing nonjudgmental, amoral attitude seems, at first blush, to
blend quite nicely with a caveat emptor approach to intimate relationships. The
question, then, is whether there is any harm done by designating sexual
relationships as a "duty-free zone." In answering this question, one might note
harms that occur both at the collective and at the individual level.
At the collective level, there is a risk of harm that is inherent in invoking
a context based argument against liability. The common law has a long and
troubling history when it comes to exempting certain "spheres" from the force of
the law. 12 The entire notion of the private sphere, as has been carefully explicated
by Professor Catherine MacKinnon and others, served for centuries to leave
women vulnerable to oppression without any legal redress.31 3 This manifested, for
instance, in the form of domestic violence, wherein the law's refusal to intrude
upon a man's private domain left women and children almost entirely dependant
upon the mercy of their "masters.314
The separation of the private from the public also had the effect of
exempting women from much of the realm of civil law. Until the past century, the
law permitted women only limited legal rights, denying them access to education,
limiting their access to the workplace, and preventing them from holding property
in their own names.315 Thus, their route to security lay in their ability to rely upon• 316
promises made to them in the context of family. As such, the failure of the
310. See Lawrence Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted
Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1093, 1095 (2002).
311. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. Jun.
12, 2003).
312. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEmNIST THEORY OF THE STATE
168-69 (1989) (arguing that a private boundary for a woman is a false notion because the
private sphere is constructed to perpetuate abuse against women).
313. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality; Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 100-02 (1987). See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
314. This is perhaps most vividly evoked by the notorious "rule of thumb," which
permitted husbands to beat their wives at will, so long as the stick used was no wider than a
man's thumb. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60 (1874); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.)
453, 459 (1868).
315. See MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN
SERIOUSLY, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-14 (2d ed. 2001).
316. Ariela Dubler's work on the law's treatment of marriage provides ample
support for this notion. See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women
and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003)
[hereinafter Dubler, Shadow of Marriage]. For a fascinating account of the negative impact
that reliance on oral promises had on women, see Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New
Historicist Reappraisal of the Parol Evidence Rule With Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 251 (2005).
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common law to extend the force of law to promises made and relied upon in the
context of the family surely had a negative impact upon women.31 7
Over the course of the twentieth century, the law of promissory estoppel
emerged as a useful tool for redressing this legal shortcoming, offering protection
to those who relied, to their detriment, upon the promises of others. 318 Nonetheless,
the common law still looks with suspicion upon many promises made, and relied
upon, in the context of the family.
319
This is not to say that women are more vulnerable than men to deception
in forming agreements with their intimate partners. Indeed, as discussed
throughout this Article, it seems that deception is equally well practiced by both
genders.320 Instead, the problem with refusing enforcement of promises made
between those who are intimately involved is that in so doing, the law denies the
possibility of remedying actual harms suffered by those who are vulnerable. 321 The
nature and genesis of the vulnerability inherent in romantic relationships renders it
naive to suggest that people's awareness of the "zone of privacy" will make them
more cautious when making agreements with intimates.322 Indeed, a posture of
complete refusal to police these promises recalls the harsh words of criticism
offered against the strict nineteenth-century rules governing consideration,
317. It is no coincidence that many of the landmark consideration cases find
women holding the short end of the proverbial stick. See, e.g., Norton v. Hoyt, 278 F. Supp.
2d 214 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that where plaintiff and defendant had been lovers for
twenty-three years and then broke up, defendant's promise to give former lover $100,000
and set up a trust that would take care of her for life is unenforceable); Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8
Ala. 131 (1845); Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2003) (holding that decedent's
promise to daughter that the family restaurant would be hers if she came back to manage the
business was unenforceable because it was unclear and ambiguous). In Brakenbury v.
Hodgkin, an elderly mother promised to give her daughter the family farm if the daughter
moved home and cared for her. 102 A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917). The daughter agreed, moved
home, and cared for her mother. Id. Shortly thereafter, the relationship between them
deteriorated, and the mother evicted the daughter and deeded the property to her son. Id.
The court found the daughter possessed an equitable interest in the property. Id. at 108; see
also John Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of
Contract, 8 FEM1NIST LEGAL STUD. 93 (2000).
318. For a relatively early example of this, see Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365
(Neb. 1898).
319. See supra Part III.A, regarding the debate about reliance damages between
unmarried cohabitants upon the dissolution of household or relationship. The contemporary
reluctance to award damages in breach of promise to marry cases also illustrates this
reluctance. See Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There's No "I Do": A Model For
Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1019 (1995) (discussing
the rejection of such claims by many jurisdictions, in spite of the fact that promissory
estoppel is applicable).
320. Subotnik, supra note 282, at 378-80.
321. See, e.g., supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (discussing the harms
left unremedied after the abolition of seduction); supra notes 140, 150-51 and
accompanying text (discussing the harms left unremedied by permitting nondisclosure in the
context of nonmarital cohabitation).
322. See supra note 249 (regarding the psychological barriers to gather material
information in the context of intimate relationships).
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promoting a rule of law that looks "with stone-eyed indifference" upon the actual
suffering of others.323
At the individual level, the risk inherent in creating a "duty-free" zone
between intimates involves the denial of compensation for harms suffered. Surely,
the harm to one whose partner persuades her to have an abortion by falsely
promising to have a child with her next year is at least as great as the harm
suffered by the unwitting purchaser of a damaged used car!324 As noted above, it is
the legal system's anxiety about remedying emotional harms, rather than a
principled distinction about the nature of bargain and reliance, that drives our
reluctance to acknowledge these damages.325
A deeper level of individual harm emerges when one considers the broad
range of consequences following from the refusal to enforce private agreements
between intimates. Witness the Jordan decision, in which Judge Seibel held
unenforceable the promise made by Jordan to pay money in exchange for Knafel's
promise not to publicize their affair.326 Prospectively speaking, this rule would
create the potential for harm not merely to the party who relies upon such a
promise (here, Knafel). It also could harm, and perhaps more profoundly, the party
whose sexual privacy might best be protected by forming a binding contract. After
all, if Judge Seibel's opinion that the contract was void against public policy was
widely accepted, then it would bring about the perhaps unintended consequence of
preventing those in circumstances like Jordan's from making legally enforceable
agreements to protect their privacy.
This result seems to place sexual privacy in the realm of other legally
taboo contracts: those involving sales of human organs, babies, sex, and slaves.
Viewed from this angle, the outcome in Jordan must be absurd, as it cannot
possibly be the case that there is widespread societal consensus that the attempt to
pay money to preserve one's sexual privacy is akin to the attempt to buy a child or
a kidney and therefore should be banned.32 7
In spite of these risks, there is a core truth in the "zone of privacy"
argument in that it would be ludicrous to impose contract liability in cases in
which the parties could not reasonably have anticipated, let alone intended, that
their words or actions amounted to binding commitments. The solution to this
problem lies in carefully applying the rules of contract and tort law to these
agreements. If the promisee reasonably understood the promisor to have intended
to make a legally binding promise, then the promise should be legally enforceable
under the law of contracts.328 If the promisor intentionally misled the promisee,
323. AMY HnSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 275-76 (2d ed. 2000)
(quoting GRANT GILMORE, TIE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)).
324. See Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct. App. 1987); M.N. v.
D.S., 616 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
325. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying text.
326. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02 CH 19143 at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill.
Jun. 12, 2003).
327. I am indebted to Professor Katharine Baker for having helped me to surface
and elucidate the issue of market inalienability of sexual privacy.
328. PERILLO, supra note 277, at 27.
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whether through silence or misrepresentation regarding material information, the
promisee should have an action in tort for such misrepresentation. 29 In some
cases, a plaintiff may have a choice of law, as it is conceivable that claims may lie
both in tort and contract.330 In many cases between intimates, particularly those
infused with a sense of violating social norms of morality, the law of tort may
provide a better remedy than that of contract. As Professor Larson explains in her
endorsement of the tort of sexual fraud:
From a contractarian perspective, a person incurs liability only for
those obligations that she has voluntarily accepted. By contrast, tort
law imposes a set of background legal duties grounded in social
morality or custom, regardless of a person's purposive choice. There
is a mistaken tendency to conceive of any liability that arises from
the act of promising as necessarily arising in contract. But where the
claim is tortious misrepresentation, the false promise instead
constitutes only the mode of inflicting injury. T3
In some cases, where neither the intention to form a legally binding agreement, nor
the intention to mislead can be proven, there may be no remedy at law for the
harms suffered.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the law governing agreements between
intimates is anachronistic in its refusal to impose a duty of disclosure with regard
to material information. The status quo, wherein caveat emptor lives on in this
most vulnerable of settings, is far from a harmless embrace of the reality that
humans lie to those whom they love. On the contrary, the law as it stands seems
not only to accept, but even to embrace the assumption that one may, with
impunity, "always hurt the one you love. 332
Ultimately, permitting nondisclosure, and even misrepresentation, in
agreements between intimates places the risk of harm, and therefore the legal
burden, on the party without the knowledge of the information in question. In
practice, this burden has toxic consequences, both in law and in policy. The burden
of securing disclosure of any risk-related information (which, in most agreements
between intimates will not be needed, as there will be nothing to disclose) falls to
the party without knowledge. As a result, "interrogation" becomes the norm, or at
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) ("One who fraudulently
makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other
in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation.").'
330. This is not controversial, of course, and it may be particularly useful for the
plaintiffs lawyer to have a choice of law in attempting to secure a recovery for intangible
damages. For a rich, if somewhat dated, discussion of the relative merits and implications of
tort versus contract in considering such damages, see Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183
(Mass. 1973).
331. Larson, supra note 24, at 417.
332. THE MiLLs BROTHERS, You Always Hurt the One You Love, on PAPER DOLL
(ASV/Living Era 2004).
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least the prudent course of action, in negotiations between intimates. Surely,
compulsory interrogation, which the law considers too inefficient and burdensome
between those bargaining at arm's-length in commercial and other settings, is even
more burdensome in intimate settings. Indeed, it is more than burdensome; it is
corrosive. Moreover, as we have seen, there are profound psychological barriers
that impede the gathering of information.
The refusal to impose conventional legal limits on the ability to lie and
mislead one's intimate partner is predicated upon false assumptions and baseless
fears. There is no reason to expect that those involved in intimate relationships are
better than nonintimates at discerning misinformation or nondisclosure when
negotiating deals. Moreover, there is little reason to anticipate catastrophic
consequences for either the law or romance were the law to impose now-standard
duties of disclosure in the context of bargains between intimates. Any risks of
creating murky legal rules or a "chilling" effect due to legal uncertainty are easily
remedied by imposing long-standing rules regarding mutual assent.
The demise of caveat emptor in the law has enhanced the fairness and the
efficiency with which we structure our dealings. In the end, these same goals are as
worthy between intimates as they are between strangers, and the law's willingness
to impose a duty to disclose will enhance, rather than harm, the quality of our
intimate relationships.
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